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Abstract 
 
 
Throughout the Cold War antagonisms of the twentieth century, the United States (US) 
championed greater global economic cooperation and an embrace of free market principles to 
encourage economic growth. Post World War II, passage of the Bretton Woods Agreement 
institutionalized this political agenda effectively establishing the rules of global commerce. The 
result has been increased economic participation and trade liberalization. One of the last 
remaining vestiges of Cold War hostility and impediments to trade is the US economic embargo 
of Cuba, in place since 1960. Increasingly seen as a policy failure, the US has taken steps in the 
past two years to normalize relations with Cuba. At the same time, after extended conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, economic recession, and political polarization over the last fifteen years 
the US finds itself in a position of ambiguity towards additional foreign commitments. American 
efforts to open Cuba to two-way commerce serve both national security and economic foreign 
policy agendas. For Cubans, removal of the embargo represents an opportunity for normal 
relations with the world’s largest economy and access to capital and markets that come with it. 
The purpose of this study is to test the theory political economy, which attempts to understand 
society through the intersection of economic, political, and social functions, using US-Cuba 
diplomacy as a case study (Yin, 2009). Working within a multiple streams framework, the 
investigator examined how economic policy is changed under politically ambiguous conditions 
through a series of 20 semi-structured qualitative interviews and content analysis of secondary 
data sources (Zahariadis, 2014). Specifically, the study explored the behavior of interested 
individuals from the US and Cuba, so-called policy entrepreneurs, and their influence on the 
policymaking process during an open policy window. Research results suggest that policy 
entrepreneurs operate at the individual, state, and national scales of society using a variety of 
symbols to create and broaden opportunities for policy change. Across all three levels, US and 
Cuban policy entrepreneur’s behavior is guided by the search for rationality in ambiguous times, 
but their agency is bounded by the institutionally determined parameters of what is legally and 
politically acceptable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: policy entrepreneurs, Cuba, public policy, economic development, freight 
transportation 
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Chapter One 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
February 28th, 2016 was a hot and sunny day in the Cerro neighborhood of Havana as 
street repairmen worked feverishly to repair the stretch of Avenida 20 de Mayo leading up to the 
Estadio Latinamericano (Figure 1); the site for an exhibition baseball game between the Tampa 
Bay Rays and the Cuban national team, just three weeks away (Figure 2). Not only did this game 
represent a gesture of good will between the two countries, on the street, word spread quickly 
that President Obama was going to be in attendance and would likely throw out the first pitch. 
Just the mention of his name brought smiles across the faces of onlookers and passersby. Along 
the street, paint crews worked just as hard scraping off old and worn exteriors and replacing 
them with generous amounts new paint from one of the many grey cans lining the sidewalk 
(Figure 3). This was the first time a sitting US president was going to visit the island of Cuba in 
over 80 years and if ever there was a time to make a good impression, this was it. 
In listening to the Cold War rhetoric of the 1960s, it seems a miracle that the United 
States (US) and Cuba have come this far in the process of normalizing diplomatic relations. A 
different Castro is in charge but little in the way of political reform has been made to expand 
democratic freedoms for average Cuban citizens. The term average Cuban citizens is used here 
to refer to those Cubans who do not hold upper level positions in the government, which garner 
political, economic, and social favor in Cuban society. 
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Figure 1 Street repair crews fixing Avenida 20 de Mayo in Cerro neighborhood of Havana, Cuba 
(Griffith, 2016) 
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Figure 2 Estadio Latinamericano, baseball stadium in Havana, Cuba (Griffith, 2016) 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Paint crews at work on Avenida 20 de Mayo (Griffith, 2016) 
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Historically, the US and Cuban economies have been intrinsically linked due to their close 
geographic proximity and resource rich lands. The Cuban revolution of 1959, the subsequent 
imposition of US economic sanctions, military actions, and antagonistic political rhetoric has 
strained this once close relationship. A review of each country’s economic fortunes over the last 
100 years provides insight into the political aspirations of America to expand its international 
standing and political influence, and Cuba in search of genuine and lasting national 
independence. 
Throughout the Cold War antagonisms of the twentieth century, the US championed 
greater global economic cooperation and an embrace of free market principles to encourage 
economic growth. Post World War II, passage of the Bretton Woods Agreement institutionalized 
this political agenda effectively establishing the rules of global commerce. The result has been 
increased global economic participation and trade liberalization. One of the last remaining 
vestiges of Cold War hostility and impediments to trade is the US economic embargo of Cuba, in 
place since 1960. Increasingly seen as a policy failure, the US has taken steps in the past two 
years to normalize relations with Cuba. At the same time, after extended conflicts in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, economic recession and political polarization over the last fifteen years the US finds 
itself in a position of ambiguity towards additional foreign commitments. 
The relative economic stability of energy producing and consuming nations, specifically 
related to oil and natural gas, influences the flow of commodities around the world. The US, a 
major global oil supplier in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw its position shift 
from energy producer to consumer over the last 60 years as its economy grew a rapid pace. At 
the onset of the twenty-first century, American oil and natural gas production resurged via 
widespread use of hydraulic fracturing (frac’ing) extraction techniques. From a national security 
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perspective this newfound production capability meant less American reliance on foreign oil 
exporters from countries like the original member nations of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Venezuela. US Gulf Coast 
states house approximately 46 and 50 percent of national oil and natural gas refining capacity, 
respectively, and as such now represent a major import and export hub attracting global freight 
flows (EIA, 2015). The close geographic proximity of Cuba to the US and its low-wage 
workforce composition makes Cuba a likely recipient of a portion of current and future Gulf 
commerce. The main hindrance to this shift in freight flows is the US embargo of Cuba. 
Cuba represents a unique opportunity for the US to alter its foreign policy agenda in the 
Gulf of Mexico, and the ongoing normalization of relations is removing barriers to increased 
cooperation. This builds upon past joint efforts focused on eliminating illegal drug trafficking 
through territorial waters. Given Cuba’s capability to disrupt US-Latin American-Caribbean 
trade and its prominent position in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America 
(ALBA) organization supporting socialist governments, it’s in US’ political and economic 
interest to cultivate a constructive working relationship (Piccone, 2015, p. 8). Economically as a 
result of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), the US is 
already the fourth largest exporter to Cuba consisting of unprocessed agricultural products and 
raw forestry material. 
Freight is defined here as any good or commodity (container, bulk) carried via multiple 
modes of transport (barge, ship, rail, truck), commonly referred to as “intermodal” transport. 
According to the Transportation Research Board (TRB) Committee on Intermodal Freight 
Transport, intermodal is defined as the use of two or more modes to move a shipment from 
origin to destination (DeWitt & Clinger, 2000). Freight movements and their supporting logistics 
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industries are a crucial element of Gulf coast economies, particularly those connected to the 
Mississippi River, one of the major gateways into the US market. 
The Lower Mississippi River region (LMRR) is the largest port complex in the US by 
tonnage and as such is a significant node in global supply chains through the Gulf of Mexico. 
This region houses five ports: Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Plaquemines, South Louisiana, and 
St. Bernard and it is one of America’s oldest commercial centers (Big River Coalition, 2014). 
Pre-embargo, the LMRR and Cuba were strong trade partners in the exchange of goods and 
people. Robins and Trujillo (1999) estimated that one third of the all cargo handled by the Port of 
New Orleans pre-embargo was destined for Cuban markets. 
As port cities, New Orleans and Havana struggle with balancing new trade growth 
through economic development while maintaining active tourism sectors. Fitzgerald and Leigh 
(2002) argue that economic development strategies should strive to increase standards of living, 
reduce inequality, and encourage sustainable resource use and production. Due to the 
significance of freight transportation to these regional economies, it is necessary to understand 
how changing international and domestic politics affects freight flows and subsequently quality 
of life and economic development at the local level. 
Research Problem 
 As Cubans have endured 55 years of embargo with minimal ideological change at the 
national level, the efficacy of US sanctions as a tool for achieving political cooperation are called 
into question. The coinciding speeches from US President Barack Obama and Cuban President 
Raúl Castro in 2014 demonstrated a commitment to new efforts in normalizing relations. Since 
then the leaders of both countries met at the Summit of the Americas in Panama and the US has 
removed Cuba from their list of state sponsors of terrorism (Siddiqui, 2015). If this trend 
continues, the US and Cuba will look for additional areas of potential trade beyond agriculture 
  7 
and forestry products, resulting in changes to freight flows within the Gulf of Mexico. The future 
of the embargo is in an uncertain state. 
Policymakers and policy experts will benefit from understanding how policy actors are 
influencing the process of reducing economic sanctions. In developing nations like Cuba, which 
represent the future growth of the global economy (BP, 2015), other factors such as energy 
security and political leadership may play a larger role in affecting policy change. The Cuban 
economy is certainly depressed but remains active as a result of recent reforms and the 
resourceful spirit of the Cuban people who have found to a way to survive. 
Purpose of the Study 
 The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the influence of policy entrepreneurs 
from the US and Cuba on the reduction of economic sanctions towards normalized diplomatic 
relations. At a higher level of generality this study attempts to understand how individuals and 
organizations re-shape society through policy interventions in political economy. To that end the 
investigation explores concepts of policy entrepreneurship, power, federalism, national identity, 
and political ideology. I apply the multiple streams approach (MSA), which describes the 
process of policy formation, to this case study to evaluate the role of policy entrepreneurs in 
theories of political economy (Kingdon, 1995; Mintrom, 1997; Béland, 2005, 2009; Mehta, 
2011; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Birkland, Camilleri, &Warnement, 2014; Zahariadis, 2014). 
Additionally, this work serves as a form of exchange for American policy networks seeking 
greater understanding of Cuban society and how average Cubans have adapted to the atmosphere 
created by their government and US economic intervention. 
Dissertation Overview 
 The dissertation is organized into six chapters including a review of relevant literature, 
study methodology, economic history of Cuba, research results, discussion, and conclusions. 
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Chapter two consists of the literature review covering the following: political economy, the MSA 
to policy analysis, globalization, neoliberalism, trade agreements, freight transportation and 
urban development, and national identity in order to construct the theoretical framework for this 
study. Political economic theory attempts to explain the organization of society through the 
interaction of economic, political, and social functions. MSA explains how policy entrepreneurs 
work to couple the problems, policies, and politics streams to create policy windows at 
politically expedient times. This review describes the impact of trade liberalization strategies on 
stakeholders in different parts of the world, subscribing to different ideological viewpoints. 
Freight transportation is the physical expression of trade therefore it is necessary to discuss the 
benefits and challenges of freight operations in urban areas. The literature on national identity 
speaks to the development of trade policies in relation to specific societal characteristics. Lastly, 
I discuss the current state of freight flows in the Gulf of Mexico and the factors affecting further 
normalization efforts between the US and Cuba. 
Chapter three outlines the study methodology comprised of the research questions and 
research design. The intent of the overarching research question is to understand the behavior of 
policy entrepreneurs from the US and Cuba on recent actions to normalize relations. Additional 
sub-research questions address the timing of policy change, specific policy entrepreneur 
behavior, historical context, and the phenomenon of policymaking in the US and Cuba. The 
research design is explained in further detail, describing the selection of explanatory mixed 
methods and its suitability for achieving study objectives. 
Chapter four characterizes the Cuban economy at various points in their history starting 
at the beginning of the twentieth century to present day. This section of the dissertation 
represents an embedded quantitative review of the Cuban economy. It provides a deeper 
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understanding of historical commodities exchange and informs identification of potential policy 
entrepreneurs at present. 
Chapter five contains the results of analysis from the qualitative interviews. Findings are 
organized into three levels of scale: individual, state, and national. Results are combined with 
participant responses retrieved from interview transcripts in support of the author’s claims. 
Finally, chapter six concludes the study and engages in a deeper discussion of the results. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
The US economic embargo of Cuba, the result of a series of political escalations, is a 
policy in flux. This is a case study of how policy entrepreneurs representing the political, 
economic, and social spheres of society influence the modern-day policymaking process as 
represented by discussions of the following: the Bretton Woods Agreement legacy, political 
economy, globalization, neoliberalism, trade agreements, freight transportation and urban 
development, MSA, national identity and trade, and freight flows in the Gulf of Mexico. The 
objective is to increase understanding of individual actor’s and/or organization’s influence over 
policy by illuminating their behavior during the last decade of US-Cuba diplomatic relations.  
The MSA in analyzing the policymaking process labels these stakeholders as policy 
entrepreneurs, who advocate for a specific policy position through the manipulation of societal 
institutions. Generally, the political economy literature focuses on modeling the effects of 
traditional economic development strategies for small, medium, and large state markets covering 
topics like preferential trade agreements, general trade liberalization practices, and World Trade 
Organization (WTO) membership. The literature on freight transportation highlights the benefits 
and drawbacks of freight movements on urban development, an area of particular concern for 
cities like New Orleans, Havana, and Mariel that are in search of new forms of sustainable 
economic growth. National identity research examines the process of national identity formation 
within the context of a globally connected world. This study adds to qualitative explanations of 
trade policy creation using the MSA, a relevant contribution to the literature on political 
economy and public policy.  
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The Bretton Woods Legacy 
The Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 marked a shift in geopolitical strategy for the 
world’s superpowers that placed greater emphasis on trade liberalization than on land 
acquisition. In past conflicts, the victorious army seized territory, re-structured societal 
institutions, and extracted value from local resources (labor, environment, culture) forever 
altering the core of a nation’s identity. But the US and its allies chose a different path post-World 
War II (WWII). Instead of collecting debts from war-torn states, they exacted economic 
cooperation in a new international system, ne built on the commitment to currency conversion 
and the unrestricted movement of capital between nations. Spero and Hart (1985) described the 
US’ role in this new economic system as threefold: the world’s central banker, international 
policymaker, and goods producer (p. 29). Initially, exchange rates were fixed to gold reserves, 
but by 1947 the US dollar became the standard valuation, given its convertibility to gold. Along 
with the concepts of currency conversion and free trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) promoted the principle of non-discrimination in international trade and assured 
commitments to reduced trade barriers. The Bretton Woods Agreement also established the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) (presently World Bank) to provide banking services for this new economic 
system. The US held considerable influence in these two institutions that set the terms of 
development in countries around the world, thereby institutionalizing its ‘free trade’ political 
agenda. 
By the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, the costs of maintaining a global economic system, 
financing a military conflict in Vietnam, expanding social welfare programs, and competing with 
rising economic powers in Germany and Japan were straining US resources and political 
attention. And in 1971 the Nixon administration effectively ended the Bretton Woods Agreement 
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by halting the direct conversion of US dollars to gold, as a reaction to the US’ declining 
economic status (Spero & Hart, 1985, p. 54). The Legacy of Bretton Woods is the expansion of 
the ways in which nations could pursue domestic interests and foreign policy goals beyond 
military aggression (Gavin, 1996). Sanctions, embargos and trade agreements, fundamentally 
political in nature, have become primary tools for managing international relationships thus 
ensuring the continuing influence of policymakers. The value of theories of political economy is 
their attempt to explain how politics permeates the economic and social spheres of society at 
various levels of scale (local, state, national, international).  
Theories of Political Economy 
Since the earliest forms of globalized commerce from European merchant’s world 
exploration in the fifteenth century, politics have been intertwined with economic activity and 
the development of civil society (Wolf, 1982). The term political economy refers to the 
relationship between the economic, political, and social functions of society (Caporaso & 
Levine, 1992). In a capitalistic system, political economy characterizes the cyclical influence of 
demand on new investment, investment on jobs, jobs on wages, and wages on demand as shown 
in Figure 4. 
Increased demand for a product convinces the business that produces it to invest in more 
staff to supply this new growth; the new staff takes these wages and uses them to purchase goods 
and services thus supporting demand and the cycle begins again. Securities are financial assets 
like stocks and bonds that are bought and sold on specific markets. They represent an alternative 
investment option for increasing value that may not be directly connected to job creation when 
compared to more traditional forms of investment to grow a business like in infrastructure, 
equipment, or training. This economic cycle between producers, consumers, and labor can 
transmit positive or negative trends based on the current state of the economy (expansion or 
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contraction). The theoretical debate lays in which forces drive the growth or recession of an 
economy, and in particular the role of state intervention in influencing these cycles. 
 
 
Figure 4 Basic model of Capitalism 
 
This dissertation supports the role for individuals in influencing political economy in a 
capitalist model. Policymaking is one method to alter the interaction of political, economic, and 
social functions, referred to here as political economy. American policymakers at the municipal, 
state, and federal levels are typically accountable to their citizens through elections, which makes 
them dependent on financial and political support to maintain their positions of power. To retain 
this support or build upon it, policymakers are susceptible to outside influence from individuals. 
MSA describes how these individuals, policy entrepreneurs, manipulate the policymaking 
process for political, economic, and social benefit. In effect, MSA is a framework for 
understanding the individual role in changing the operation of societal institutions. 
Keynesianism 
The Keynesian theory of political economy found widespread adoption by Western 
nations throughout the twentieth century. This approach viewed the economy as cyclical and 
Demand
Investment
Jobs
Wages
Securities
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unstable, with periods of growth and contraction (recession) based on the level of demand. In 
times of low demand for goods and services the overall economy stagnates, growth slows, and 
unemployment rises. Caporaso and Levine (1992) assert that this represents a market failure 
from the Keynesian perspective and that the state, as an interested actor, had a responsibility to 
stabilize the economy at the macroeconomic level through stimulation of demand. This process 
is referred to as demand management and is accomplished by manipulation of government 
spending, government borrowing, and taxation. The economic cycle is dependent upon the 
connection between income and employment where rising incomes translate to increased 
expenditures on goods and services, which in turns raises demand and business cash flow that 
can be re-invested into expanding production. 
Keynesianism views free markets as structurally flawed and unable to maintain adequate 
demand, contrary to the concept of the “self-regulating market” introduced in classical theories 
of political economy. Caporaso and Levine (1992) highlight the tension between the individual 
accumulation of capital and the productive use of that capital for the public good (demand 
stimulus). This position was in contrast to the classical and Marxian approaches that stated 
private capital accumulation would result in increased individual ownership of the means of 
production and higher societal productive capacity (Marx & Engels, 1978). 
From a labor perspective, Keynesianism contended that because production and 
investment are demand dependent, laborers lack the bargaining power to sufficiently manage 
employment levels, justifying the need for state intervention. The Keynesian approach is limited 
by the economic competency of state actors and institutions in demand management efforts. 
Timing, scale, and scope of intervention are significant concerns influencing the success of each 
effort. Due to the shift in capital investments from productive capital to financial assets, the 
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economy became increasingly reliant on financial circulation to earn profits, typically in the form 
of short-term capital gains. Within this context, Keynes asserted that the power of state 
intervention was greatest in short-term investment but that the success of such policies was 
dependent on if the effort was seen as politically or administratively executed (Caporaso & 
Levine, 1992). 
New Trade Theory 
New Trade Theory (NTT) is an economic concept that attempts to explain the operation 
of the global economy based on small differences between trade partners, in this case countries. 
Tabarrok (2008) argues that NTT is an expansion of the theory of comparative advantage, which 
purports that within trade between two partners each one will focus on production of the good or 
service that they can produce at the least cost. The result is that countries can maximize 
production levels of this good or service and then participate in international trade. Comparative 
advantages include characteristics like geography and labor force composition. 
NTT works within the context of economies of scale in production and says that the 
reasons for industry specializations occurring in a particular country are not necessarily due to its 
comparative advantages. Economies of scale refer to the reduction in price of a good as the 
number of units manufactured increases. Economies of scale promote industry concentration 
whose location determination is in contention between two forces, the desire for greater access to 
resources or greater access to large markets. The motivations behind the final determination are 
often arbitrary. This theory helps to explain why many similar countries with similar 
comparative advantages trade with one another (Krugman, 1980). Trade between similar 
economies expands the variety of goods available to consumers while allowing producers to 
reduce variety of goods produced. Within NTT, government plays the role of initial investor in a 
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particular industry or location that creates an attractive force for private investment. Furthermore, 
NTT argues for greater trade liberalization to increase economic growth (Krugman, 2008). 
Competitiveness of Nations 
Porter’s theory of Competitiveness of Nations describes a nation’s economic health in 
terms of its overall industrial productivity. National competitiveness is based on four 
characteristics, which Porter termed the national diamond: 1. factor conditions, 2. demand 
conditions, 3. related and supporting industries, and 4. firm strategy, structure and rivalry. Factor 
conditions are split into inherited basic factors (natural resources, location) and created advanced 
factors (infrastructure, skilled labor). Demand conditions relate to how local demand can 
strengthen industrial competitiveness abroad. Related and supporting industries refer to the 
amount of industry clustering and the resulting strength because of the proximity of industry 
partners. Firm strategy refers to the composition of domestic firms and the need for rivalry 
between them to spur growth and advancement. Within the national diamond framework the 
government can influence economic operations through subsidies, industry regulation, education 
policy, tax policy, and procurement policy (Davies & Ellis, 2000). 
Jelinek (1992) asserted that Porter’s work had two main distinctions from previous 
economic theories, the first being that due to the dynamic nature of economies, competitive 
advantages come and go and that they can only be maintained through continual production 
increases. Davies and Ellis (2000) critiqued Porter’s theory as flawed because of the false 
equivalence of competiveness and productivity, the ambiguity of his definition of nation (people 
versus firms), and his conflation of comparative advantage and competitive advantage. 
Comparative advantage relates to what industries a nation’s economy should support based on 
available resources, while competitive advantage describes how firms within an industry 
compete with one another. 
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From the literature on political economy it is evident that policy entrepreneurs originate 
from the public and private sectors and take the form of public officials, individual consumers, 
and industry representatives. Keynesianism highlights the influence of policymakers on 
stimulating demand for goods and services and increasing the circulation of capital. NTT 
describes the influence of governments as investment stimulators and consumers as demand 
stimulators. Competitiveness of Nations focuses on the influence of policy entrepreneurs in 
government and private industry in affecting national economic performance. 
Globalization 
Globalization describes the increasing connectedness of international actors and a shift of 
power towards those economies and corporations that have structured themselves to take 
advantage of global resources. This restructuring has changed the relationship of labor and 
markets. Castells (1989) describes the increasing duality within labor markets between the 
professional and managerial middle class and the urban underclass due to a production shift 
towards the informational mode of development. The informational mode of development 
defines productivity in terms of the quality of knowledge, which marks a departure from 
traditional production of physical goods to production/manipulation of information and data. 
Castells (1996) argues that the economies of postindustrial cities are being re-organized based on 
knowledge generation and informational flows, which encourages growth in advanced services 
industries like finance, law, and telecommunications. Knowledge-based corporation’s 
relationship with labor is fundamentally different than that of manufacturing-based industries in 
that, “they constitute networks of production and management, whose flexibility needs not to 
internalize workers and suppliers, but to be ale to access them when it fits, and in the time and 
quantities that are required in each particular instance” (Castells, 1996). 
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Whereas manufacturing a product has a definite production sequence and requires 
employees to be physically present at a central location, knowledge-based services have no such 
spatial requirement or set production sequence. As a result the labor force becomes increasingly 
disjointed and is forced to accept the terms of work set forth by transnational corporations that 
lack accountability to any single country (Sassen, 2000). 
Castells (1996) describes the economic re-structuring of society based on informational 
flows between physically disjointed social actors as the space of flows. The space of flows 
concept is made up of three components: technological, geographical, and social. The 
technological component deals with the role of communications advancements in facilitating the 
flow of knowledge. The geographical component outlines the spatial organization of nations into 
nodes (districts centered around the key functions of the network) and hubs (exchange and 
communication points). The social component centers on a spatial re-organization towards a 
uniform concept of elite preference (ahistorical, alcultural architecture). Urban freight 
transportation supports the space of flows concept by facilitating the movement of physical 
goods that underlies the knowledge-based economy. 
Wolf (1982) outlines the development of global capitalism in terms of a dichotomy 
between Europeans (advanced) and non-Europeans (primitive). Here primitive is defined as 
lacking certain technological advancements. He asserts that capitalism did not create new 
markets of trade in primitive countries, but it re-structured pre-existing markets to increasingly 
rely on global supply of goods for survival. And by crafting a history that excludes the 
contributions of these more primitive societies, historians are distorting reality. Trouillot (2003) 
asserts that globalization is not a new concept and it has existed since the 16th century, but what 
is new to our time is extreme polarization and inequality. 
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Technological advancements allow for greater labor productivity and the maintenance of 
current economic functions with fewer and fewer laborers. Advances in telecommunications 
have increased the speed of information transfer and consequently the exchange of financial 
capital. Trouillot (2003) describes this phenomenon as a distortion of both time and space. In 
addition to financial transactions, this flow of information is used to market a single global 
culture based on a narrow set of consumer behavior. But according to Trouillot (2003) a 
contradiction exists between the goals of the market and the people, “the market economy itself 
prevents the rise of a global market society because human being everywhere have and will have 
goals that are not market oriented.” Polanyi (1944) raised the same concerns of the antagonistic 
relationship between a market economy and a market society. A market society requires the 
commodification of labor, land, and money, which subjects the social aspect of society to the 
economic (the market). Polanyi (1944) argues that this social subjugation will lead to the 
destruction of society. Those laborers with privileged access to information flows and the ability 
to manipulate them, consistently use their power to blur the line between social and economic in 
maintenance of the status quo that further oppresses other less privileged sects of the labor 
market. 
Young (1990) describes the division of labor with the concept of “respectability” that 
routinely affords professionals the privilege of or a tendency to acknowledge the value in their 
ideas and actions. At the opposite end of the labor spectrum, non-professionals must constantly 
earn “respectability” by demonstrating their worth. In what is referred to as cultural imperialism, 
non-professionals are labeled “the other” within the labor market and are further marginalized. 
Non-professional jobs are overrepresented in service sector industries (tourism, hotel 
accommodations, entertainment) prevalent in the New Orleans economy.  
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Young (1990) defines social justice as, “full participation and inclusion of everyone in a 
society’s major institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity for all to develop 
and exercise their capacities and realize their choices” and the polarization of the labor market 
oppresses non-professionals. She is critical of American social institutions that use the principle 
of merit to justify uneven distribution of nonmaterial goods and resources. The perception of a 
meritocracy in the US reinforces the hierarchical division of labor.  
Young (1990) refers to corporate capital as homeless in its diminishing connection to 
place while highlighting the contradiction of municipalities reliance on corporate capital to 
support their economies. Following the 2008 economic recession American cities have looking 
for economic development strategies that can spur economic growth. Cities like Pittsburgh (PA) 
have recovered from the loss of their manufacturing base in steel by re-structuring their economy 
focusing on advanced services industries that can capture the flow of global capital. This 
economic re-structuring involves implementation of new policies and a re-organization of 
existing institutional governance structures. But concerns arise as to outcomes resulting from 
these new institutions. Fainstein (2011) concludes that to ensure just outcomes in cities, planners 
should shift their objectives from economic development to social equity guided by the 
principles of democracy, diversity, and equity.  
Levels of scale are a significant factor in understanding the power relationships in urban 
governance structures. Tomaney et al. (2010) argues that local and regional economic 
development polices that solely focus on economic growth are misguided. Along these lines, 
Fitzgerald and Leigh (2002) state that economic development strategies should not only be 
concerned with growth but with the institutional mechanisms for distributing the benefits of that 
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growth. Institutional power should be decentralized across scales to address increasing 
inequality. 
Inequality must be a key issue in these re-prioritized development strategies, with a focus 
on increasing employment. The employment benefits that accompany business growth such as 
transportation infrastructure expansion come with trade-offs in the built environment. Farmer 
and Noonan (2011) use Chicago’s public mass transit system to describe the infrastructure 
disinvestment fallout as a result of neoliberal policies. The Chicago Transit Authority reduced 
services and eliminated union benefits despite receiving federal economic stimulus money 
following the 2008 economic recession. Farmer and Noonan (2011) assert that the Chicago elite 
exploited the 2008 economic recession in order to increase budget cuts to public sector services. 
These budget cuts harm the long-term sustainability of major public institutions and services that 
have a high use-value for many local residents. 
Geoghegan (2010) contends that middle class Americans would experience a higher 
quality of life in European social democracies because of their increased social relief spending 
and labor power. The private market and social welfare need not necessarily be opposing 
systems. His argument is based on the concept of universal public goods including healthcare, 
education, child/elderly care that create greater life stability in the workforce. Public goods are 
distorted for profits sake when distributed through the private market, as evidenced by poor US 
healthcare outcomes relative to other developed nations despite spending the most of any nation. 
Geoghegan (2010) argues that securing public goods for an entire nation as opposed to an 
individual shifts the balance of power in negotiations to the people, often leading to better 
outcomes at a lower price. In sum, Geoghegan (2010) identifies the European social democracy 
model as a way to discuss solutions to social problems in non-monetary terms. Citizens should 
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not fear state intervention in the form of planning efforts because they provide a certain level of 
conformity to ensure the continued existence of our society. State intervention is necessary to 
protect the right to freedom that underscores many Western societies (Polanyi, 1944). 
Neoliberalism 
 Neoliberalism refers to the ideology of personal economic responsibility, free markets, 
privatization, minimal state intervention (deregulation), and reduced social relief spending. 
Harvey (2007) critiques neoliberalization as, “either a utopian project to realize a theoretical 
design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a political project to re-establish 
the conditions for capital accumulation and restore the power of economic elites.” In practice 
when the free market ideals have come in conflict with elite interests, it is the elite’s will that 
dominates. Therefore, neoliberalism can be seen as an ideology of convenience to maintain 
unequal capital distribution channels. This ideology is hostile towards any solidarity among the 
workforce and accelerates inequality among nations through the flow of capital to the world’s 
major financial nodes (Harvey, 2007). Wolf (1982) identifies this biased system as a major 
contributor to Europe’s rapid ascendance within the global economy of the 16th century.  
Fainstein (2011) describes the conditions necessary for the proliferation of neoliberal 
ideology as, “heightened individualism and consumerism among the middle classes along with 
rebellion against seemingly unresponsive government bureaucracies made portions of the public 
receptive to an ideology favoring deregulation and reliance on market processes.” Trouillot 
(2003) explains the neoliberal phenomenon as an endorsement of growth as amoral value 
regardless of the distribution structure. He goes on to highlight the decreasing significance of 
labor in the operation of the global economy. The global economic elite or “global oligarchy” 
estimate this number at one fifth of the active population, where the other four fifths are left with 
tittytainment, “titty as in tits and motherhood, that is, enough milk for the poor to survive poorly 
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and plenty of entertainment to maintain their good spirits.” (Trouillot, 2003). And whereas 
neoliberalism rails against government intervention, cities that house major financial institutions 
have come to depend upon government assistance to maintain social order and technological 
infrastructure critical to their continued operation. The US’ commitment to neoliberal strategies 
is manifested in the pursuit of international trade agreements with other nations, setting the terms 
of global trade. 
Trade Agreements 
Arguments for increased global economic connectedness focus on the importance of 
trade in spurring domestic development. Sanderson (1992) exposes the dubious connection 
between trade and development, and calls the pursuit of greater trade with more developed 
economies as wholly self-defeating for many Latin American nations. Furthermore, he argues 
that, “the reallocation of economic resources to trade comes at the cost of domestic development, 
and often at the cost of nonrenewable natural resources” (Sanderson, 1992, p. 10). In this way 
international trade must be understood in the context of power and who sets the terms of 
agreement. Governance structures and resource distribution channels are also shaped by power 
imbalances, as local gains from trade have been disproportionately distributed among the Latin 
American population. 
The literature on international trade makes a clear distinction between the effects of 
engaging in preferential trade agreements (PTA) and pursuing trade liberalization strategies 
aimed at increasing economic openness. Barboza and Trejos (2010) label the former approach as 
economic integration de jure (through agreements) and the latter as economic integration de 
facto (through markets). PTAs are arrangements in which participating nations agree to reduce 
tariffs on specific goods to boost trade of said good among members. Bhagwati (1991) and 
Shadlen (2005) assert that PTAs have the potential to increase trade among member nations at 
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the expense of non-member nations (trade diversion) resulting in less integrated and inefficient 
regional economic growth. Furthermore, Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) suggest that more 
economically influential countries like the US use PTAs as a means of dividing non-hegemonic 
governments within a region to achieve more favorable trade outcomes. Sharma and Chua (2000) 
conclude that PTAs do not necessarily increase trade in multi-national regional cooperatives but 
that a general reduction of trade barriers may be a more effective tool for improving economic 
growth. So given the uncertainty of outcomes from trade liberalization strategies, Galantucci 
(2013) argues that politics is a significant determinant in whether or not governments pursue 
PTAs. Political manipulation underscores economic development decisions involving trade 
liberalization strategies with very different economic outcomes. 
In his discussion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mayer (1998) 
rationalizes Mexico’s participation as opportune timing in which international goals aligned with 
Mexican national policy agenda. NAFTA satisfied Mexican leadership’s desire to increase 
foreign capital investments, to raise Mexico’s international standing, to open up Mexico’s 
economy to the international community, and to institutionalize these economic reforms 
solidifying their long-term impact. From the US perspective, NAFTA represented a response to 
formation of the EU and an opportunity to aide economic development in a neighboring nation. 
Mayer (1998) characterizes the fight over NAFTA in the US as a symbolic one. From the labor 
perspective NAFTA represented corporate greed and societal exploitation (pollution, job loss, 
illegal immigration), politically NAFTA was an opportunity to fundamentally reduce 
protectionist trade policies while commercially, NAFTA solidified access to new markets and 
created new opportunities for economic growth. The legacy of NAFTA is less about the details 
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of the law but how it fundamentally altered the working relationship between Canada, Mexico, 
and the US. 
The US has a history of free trade agreements with other Latin American nations in 
Central and South America in addition to the Caribbean. Palmer (1979) describes Caribbean 
economies as increasingly dependent on the US economy for development but this dependence 
has also made island nations more vulnerable to external economic events. He analyzes 
dependence based on four areas: trade, financial, emigration, and local economic policy. 
Hornbeck (2011) characterizes US-Caribbean relations as a series of unilateral agreements 
beginning with the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983. Apparel imports increased 
due to new tariff preferences under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act of 2000. In 2006 
Haitian apparel received preferential import treatment via the Haiti HOPE Act. Unilateral trade 
agreements require that only one country remove restrictions to trade e.g. import tariffs. In more 
recent trade agreements the US has taken a bilateral approach like the Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) of 2004 with the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which also focused on apparel 
tariffs. 
Since 1973 the Caribbean Community also known as CARICOM has promoted economic 
cooperation and foreign policy agreement among fifteen full member nations: Antigua and 
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and 
Tobago (Caribbean Community Secretariat, 2011). In 2013 the US signed a trade investment 
pact with CARICOM reducing US tariffs by 85 percent on Caribbean goods. Additionally, this 
agreement established an oversight council charged with advancing trade liberalization and 
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addressing energy security, energy efficiency, system sustainability, and energy affordability 
concerns (Dupre, 2013). 
The case of Vietnam joining Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) provides 
an example of how regional economic associations can give formerly isolated communist nations 
a chance to gradually increase free market participation on their own terms. ASEAN is a ten-
member nation organization charged with promoting economic growth and regional stability in 
the Southeast Asia region established in 1967 (ASEAN, 2015). Thanh (2015) asserts that the 
Vietnamese economy pre-1980’s was centrally planned and focused on trade with former 
socialist nations. But in order to address growing economic problems (rising inflation), Vietnam 
began to pursue a mixed-market socialist economy through the Doi Mai reformation movement. 
Doi Mai paved the way for increased trade liberalization including the 1987 Foreign Investment 
Law, the 1993 reestablishment of relations with international economic institutions (International 
Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank), and the 1995 cooperative agreement with the EU. 
Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995 and since then has contributed to an easing of ASEAN-
Indochinese relations, to regional security by signing the Treaty on Southeast Asian Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone, to institutional restructuring that allied with free markets, and to increased 
commodity exchange with other ASEAN member nations (Chauhan, 2013). Cuba faces similar 
obstacles in reforming its centrally organized economy. 
US trade relations with Cuba are currently governed by six statutes: the Trading with the 
Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), the Cuba Assets 
Control Regulations of 1963 (CACR), the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA), the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms–Burton Act) of 1996, and the Trade Sanctions 
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) (see Table 3). TWEA allows the US 
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president to restrict trade with any country in times of war. Cuba remains the only country whose 
trade with the US is still constrained by TWEA since North Korea’s removal from the restricted 
list in 2008. The FAA restructured the US mechanism for delivering foreign aid creating US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and it further codified prohibitions of aid to 
Cuba. The CACR imposed an immediate freeze of all Cuban assets in the US, implemented strict 
regulation of any US commercial activity with Cuba, and prohibited direct or indirect export of 
US goods or services to Cuba. The CDA, also known as the Torricelli Act, prevented US 
subsidiary companies to trade with Cuba, forbade US nationals from traveling to the island, and 
prohibited the of delivery of remittances. The Helms-Burton Act further strengthened US 
sanctions against Cuba, which included restricting Cuba’s economic ties with other partners and 
opposing Cuba’s membership in international financial institutions. TSRA was the first piece of 
legislation to ease restrictions against the Cuban government; it allowed the US to export food, 
agricultural products, forestry products, and medicine to Cuba while US import restrictions 
persist (Amnesty International, 2009). 
Results from the use of trade sanctions as a mechanism for achieving foreign policy goals 
are mixed. Lektzian and Patterson (2015) argue that the enactment of comprehensive sanctions 
without considering a nation’s defining characteristics rarely lead to a change in behavior from 
the sanctioned government. A more effective approach distinguishes between countries with 
more open trade policies and those that are more closed to trade. Lektzian and Patterson’s 
approach recommends sanctions that weaken owners and intensive users of abundant factors in 
more open nations and hurt owners and intensive users of scarce factors in more closed nations. 
Abundant and scarce factors refer to the availability of assets a country is endowed with such as 
labor, capital, human capital (skilled labor), land, and natural resources (Deardorff, 2016). Study 
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results are summarized in Table 1, which suggest that trade sanctions can be an effective tool to 
change behavior if designed and implemented in a way that targets those economic actors who 
directly benefit from international trade activity in more open and closed societies. 
Table 1 Factors affecting the success of sanction (Lektzian & Patterson, 2015)  
 
Freight Transportation and Urban Development 
International goods and commodities exchange is essential not only to the economic 
development of cities but to the spatial organization, mobility, employment, environment, 
culture, and governance of urban areas. Freight transportation is the means by which cities 
participate in the flow of goods connecting producers with consumers in local, regional, national, 
and international contexts. A city’s port, highway, rail, airport, and pipeline infrastructure raise 
its status as an access point or hub for freight flows, which contributes to the development of 
related support industries in surrounding areas. The economic contribution of freight 
transportation is well documented (Ogden, 1992), but efforts to understand the impact of freight 
transportation on other aspects of society are relatively lacking in comparison to those of 
passenger transit. Freight transportation is a quality of life issue that remains discussed in 
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abstract terms, wholly separate from the urban communities it supports (Cui, Dodson, & Hall, 
2015). Urban populations already account for approximately 54 percent of total global 
population and are on the rise. It is up to urban planners, policymakers, and freight managers to 
guide expansion of urban freight operations to maximize its benefits while minimizing negative 
externalities (WHO, 2015). 
Historically, concerns for the transportation of people and goods have influenced land 
development decisions in the US. Jackson (1987) attests that access to bodies of water was 
instrumental in the location of new cities. America’s complex network of inland waterways 
combined with access to larger bodies of water like the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico 
provided cities with a means to participate in domestic and international freight networks. In the 
case of New Orleans, the Mississippi River supported the migration and commerce fundamental 
to the founding of the Port of New Orleans, the US’ oldest port of commerce. 
On land, Goddard (1996) chronicles the contentious relationship between railroads, 
trucks, automobiles, and the federal government. In the early development stages, the federal 
government donated land to rail owners to expand their operations across the country. As the 
railroads grew in size and popularity, the government began to introduce new industry 
regulations. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 established the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) to provide some stability to fair rates in the transportation industry. This was 
the start of the antagonistic relationship between rail and the government, a situation that 
worsened with the rise of personal automobile use and the trucking industry. During the first half 
of the twentieth century, the trucking industry was relatively left untouched by federal regulators. 
Automobile advocates led by Thomas MacDonald, the top civil engineer of the Bureau of Public 
Roads, lobbied for the improvement and expansion of America’s roadways based on the belief 
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that quality roads were a fundamental human right (Jackson, 1987). Cui, Dodson, and Hall 
(2015) argue that the US’ decentralization of power in freight transportation planning to local 
jurisdictions has contributed to the uneven exercise of oversight industry-wide including 
regulation, financing, and maintenance. This disorganization limits the ability of governments to 
consistently address the negative impacts of freight transportation. 
Activity from the freight transportation sector produces negative externalities in urban 
and rural settings involving concerns of livability, congestion, emissions, infrastructure 
maintenance, land use planning, and governance. Often freight planning research focuses on the 
economic side of freight such as improving efficiency of operations, but a growing body of 
literature is investigating the negative impacts of freight movements in cities (Anderson et al., 
2005). On the issue of congestion, freight transportation is seen as interfering with passenger 
transportation on shared roadways despite accounting for an estimated 10-15 percent of total 
metropolitan road traffic (Cui, Dodson, & Hall, 2015). Freight transportation is also a major 
contributor to contaminant emissions as the diesel fuel burned by trucks and rail release large 
amounts of particulate into the atmosphere with adverse health effects on adjacent populations. 
The noise and vibration generated by trucks in residential areas reduces quality of life over time 
for residents. Moreover trucks cause disproportionate damage to roadways compared to private 
automobiles based on their larger vehicle size and heavier payload. Hesse and Rodrigue (2004) 
suggest that the rise in urban populations creates land use conflicts over limited land resources 
between freight operations and competing alternative development interests. As a result, the 
transportation planning process covering policy and regulation is greatly politicized. 
The process of freight transportation planning in the US suffers from uncoordinated 
policy and regulation development across regions, originating from a disjointed planning 
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approach at national and local levels. Oftentimes, local authorities are more focused on land use 
and quality of life issues versus national authorities whose attention centers on economic 
development and environmental regulation initiatives. Policy solutions at the local level also tend 
to be reactive to resident and local business complaints, resulting in shortsighted policies aimed 
at constraining freight activities as opposed to considering how cities can facilitate increased 
future freight demand (Cui, Dodson, & Hall, 2015). Dablanc et al. (2013) highlights the lack of 
quality freight data available to the public as another issue contributing to poor policy outcomes. 
Planners, researchers, and policymakers have yet to agree on the appropriate metric for 
measuring the net effects of freight transportation; therefore they lack the ability to fully 
comprehend the impact of new and existing policies and regulations. This lack of empirical 
support increases policymaking vulnerability to outside influences from differing stakeholders. 
The freight sector includes a wide spectrum of policy entrepreneurs that could be 
classified as public, private, or a combination of the two. Planners and policymakers draft policy, 
regulate, and allocate funds for maintenance and construction of public freight transportation 
infrastructure. Private entities such as receivers, carriers, forwarders, and shippers conduct the 
business of commodities exchange. Dedicated freight transportation infrastructure such as ports, 
railroads, and warehousing/storage present a unique planning challenge because at different 
times it has been owned privately and publicly. For example, ports are generally self-sustaining 
public entities that operate without traditional forms of government financial assistance, as in the 
case of the Port of New Orleans. Residents also play a role in influencing freight policy debates, 
as their interests may not be transportation related (Taylor, 2005).  
Freight policymaking is susceptible to other influencing factors based on spatial, land-
use, economic specialization, infrastructure, regulatory, and sociohistorical considerations. In 
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other words, freight movements are a constrained by a city’s defining traits. Influencers can be 
grouped into four general categories: legal and institutional, financial, political and cultural, and 
practical and technological (Stathopoulos et al., 2012; May, Kelly, & Shepard, 2006). In urban 
contexts, trucks are the pre-dominant mode of freight transportation, so influencers related to 
roadways may receive additional attention in the policymaking process. In this current 
decentralized organizational structure, urban planners are encouraged to think and act solely 
within their own jurisdictional boundaries despite the fact that freight transportation is a multi-
jurisdictional operation. The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) is US 
policymakers’ attempt to foster multi-jurisdictional collaboration in transportation planning 
through the creation of new means for investment in freight transportation networks. It remains 
to be seen what impact the recent passage of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation 
(FAST) Act in 2015 will have on local freight planning initiatives (FHWA, 2015). 
America’s dependence on the steady supply of oil to fuel its economy has driven its 
foreign policy objectives throughout the twentieth century. As consumption outpaced production 
the US became more reliant on emerging oil producers in the Persian Gulf i.e. Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, and Kuwait. In what Yergin (1990) termed the “oil weapon”, these countries used their 
increasing energy market share to manipulate the price of oil for greater financial gain, 
effectively exposing America’s vulnerability. Oil security became a top national priority and the 
US committed to protecting transnational supply routes with military force, in what would 
become know as the “Carter Doctrine.” But with the resurgence of domestic oil and natural gas 
production and the commitment to renewable energy sources, the significance of energy imports 
is diminishing and the US may be willing to reduce its prominent role in securing global energy 
shipments (Parraguez Kobek, Ugarte, & Aguilar, 2015; Priest, 2012). This newfound energy 
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security also allows US policymakers to seek non-military resolutions to outstanding foreign 
policy problems, one of the oldest being the embargo of Cuba. Evidence of a shift in policy 
towards Cuba occurred as recently as 2000 with the passage of the Trade and Sanctions Reform 
and Export Enhancement Act that granted one-year export permits for food and medicine to the 
island. But beyond this minor change in policy with Cuba, the bulk of economic sanctions and 
travel restrictions persist. 
Policymaking and the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) 
The Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) is a framework for understanding how policy is 
made (agenda setting, decision-making, implementation) based on the interaction of problem 
streams, policies streams, politics streams, policy entrepreneurs, and policy windows. MSA 
attempts to explain the policymaking process in times of ambiguity, defined as the existence of 
multiple perspectives on a single issue (Mintrom, 1997; Zahariadis, 2014, p. 26). MSA rejects 
rationality and embraces ambiguity, accepting that the policymaking process is convoluted. In 
this way MSA is reliant on external stimuli from policy entrepreneurs to explain the existence of 
policy windows the resulting policy outcomes. 
In broader terms, the driving force behind major policy change is periodic and based on 
outside provocation. MSA can be categorized as an agenda setting theory, as external actors 
manipulate the process. Although MSA acknowledges the role of institutions and their rules in 
decision-making processes, it uses informal rules and formal venues. This means MSA operates 
within well-defined societal categories (problem, policies, politics), yet it remains unclear how 
these streams combine and in which stream a policy window will arise. With regard to 
theoretical elements, MSA operates at the system level of analysis that underscores the 
importance of collective decision-making in a continually changing society. MSA can 
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accommodate an expanded policy agenda due to this wide scope, which muddles the 
policymaking process (Zahariadis, 2014). 
The problem stream comprises citizens’ and policymakers’ concerns and grievances. 
Zahariadis (2014) connects the number of problems on the policy agenda, or problem load, with 
the real and perceived effectiveness of policymakers. Too many problems on the agenda 
diminish policymaker’s ability to prioritize issues and as a result, effort and resources are 
targeted toward problems, “they may be able to solve rather than those that must be solved.” (p. 
33) Indicators, focusing events, and feedback are some of the common ways policymakers learn 
about new problems to address. Typically, indicators are specific societal measures or statistics 
that suggest the existence of a problem. Focusing events are one-time or developing events that 
focus public attention on a particular problem, thus raising its significance and status on the 
political agenda. Lastly, feedback relates to the lessons learned from previous policy initiatives 
that can guide solutions for other problems. 
The policies stream is the collection of ideas generated by networks of bureaucrats, 
academics, and researchers to address the problems stream. Given the large volume of policy 
proposals, policymakers narrow the field based on technical feasibility, value acceptability, and 
resource availability (Zahariadis, 2014, p. 33). Idea prioritization is also determined based 
institutional structures for the generation of new ideas, referred to as policy networks. These 
networks are classified as more or less integrated based on their size, mode, capacity, and access. 
Policymakers prioritize ideas from specific policy networks due to reputation, past relationships, 
and ideological perspectives, in what could be considered their political orientation. 
Politics plays a major role in the manipulation of the policymaking process and within 
MSA, is represented by the politics stream. The politics stream attempts to gauge the extent of 
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political support a policymaker has in acting to solve a problem. According to Zahariadis (2014) 
the politics stream involves three components: the national mood, pressure-group campaigns, 
and administrative or legislative turnover (p. 34). National mood is the general sentiment of a 
large number of individuals in a country, and is sometimes measured in national polls. 
Policymakers are influenced by pressure-group campaigns, often advocating for policy action (or 
inaction) on a specific issue of interest. As it implies, institutional turnover refers to the number 
of new administrators or legislators entering positions of power and how their ideology favors 
one problem over another. Outside influencers actively work within one or more streams to 
create opportunities for policy change. 
Policy entrepreneurs, defined here as individuals or organizations with a vested interest in 
a policy area, foster conditions that lead to the combination of all three streams and the opening 
of a policy window. Qualitative interviews reveal how policy entrepreneurs use policy as a 
means to disrupt the normal operations of societal institutions. The process of policymaking is a 
bridge between the individual and the institution, one component of market economies that 
connects agency and structure. Interview findings demonstrate the role of policy entrepreneurs as 
agents of change within larger theories of political economy. 
Policy entrepreneurs are political manipulators in that they strive to communicate 
meaning and clarity to an ambiguous policymaking process. Through qualitative interviews, this 
study discovers what kinds of messages policy entrepreneurs developed to open policy windows 
and create policy change once inside. Their success is dependent on the amount of resources and 
political access. Zahariadis (2014) contends that a policy has a better chance of acceptance when 
the three streams are joined (p. 35) A policy window is an opportunity for issues to move to the 
top of the policymaking agenda and potentially become adopted policy. Policy windows are 
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bounded by time and occur one at a time. Significant events can open policy windows in the 
problem stream but windows can also open in the politics streams.  
These political policy windows are ideological in nature. The two policy windows differ 
in that problem-based windows are focused on solving a definite problem with less emphasis on 
the actual solution, while politics-based windows are focused on solutions to a less defined 
problem. The current policy window in US-Cuba diplomacy cannot be attributed to any single 
focusing event defining a problem; therefore it originates in the politics stream. US officials have 
yet to communicate the problem behind recent actions to normalize diplomatic relations with 
Cuba. The goal is to reach rationale based on an existing embargo policy that has failed to 
achieve any notable change in Cuban governance. 
MSA’s strengths and weaknesses are dependent on timing and external stimuli. The 
strengths of using external events lay in the ability to capitalize on moments of mass consensus. 
Events are often very shocking and can elicit strong emotional responses that temporarily or 
permanently overcome ideological beliefs. This momentary climate can speed up the 
policymaking process, which is typically slowed by continual debate. One weakness of using 
external events is that the window of opportunity is temporally bounded, essentially limited to 
the issue’s relevance in public discourse. Another weakness is that ideological differences may 
be so entrenched within individuals on a particular issue that no magnitude of event could create 
the political will necessary to pass major policy change. Political actors can also frame how the 
public perceives events, impacting its relevance in public discourse and the subsequent pressure 
on policymakers to act. Policy entrepreneurs of great wealth can use their financial strength to 
influence the public narrative as well. This influence manifests itself in the form of campaign 
contributions, advertising, and dissemination of propaganda through popular media outlets to 
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shorten the length of policy windows or keep them closed all together. Opportunities for trade 
policy change are temporally bound, yet the outcomes have long lasting impacts on the daily life 
of local populations. 
National Identity and Trade 
National identity is a key element in the process of trade liberalization, and it is cultivated 
in different ways. The process of national identity development is susceptible to manipulation to 
serve varying economic interests. At the individual level, identity formation implies an ongoing 
process of self-reflection and reproduction. Commonalities among this collection of identities 
represent one aspect of national character (Zahariadis, 2014, p. 34). Politically motivated 
individuals and organizations form national identity through more deliberate actions. 
Corporations and governments operate at higher levels of scale to communicate a unified 
characterization or “brand” of specific identities for regions, states, and nations (Brash, 2011). 
The tourism industry is just one example of this conceptual conflict between scales, where inter -
regional, -state, and -national competition is the norm through advertising campaigns distilling 
locally formed character into a national identity. 
The manipulation of media, national symbols, and physical landscape is used to 
communicate a single vision of a nation’s identity (Schwenkel, 2013). National symbols like 
holidays, historical figures, official languages, and foreign policy views are influential signifiers 
of shared culture (Sahm, 1999). Graan (2013) describes the state’s interest in promoting a 
common identity (nation branding) as the desire to project an image of stability to the rest of the 
world, to attract foreign investment and tourism. Often this top-down approach towards identity 
formation occurs in relation to external actors. Omi and Winant (1994) contend that notions of 
nationalism can develop in response to colonialism or other types of occupying forces (p. 37). 
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The societal re-organization effects of nation branding can elicit similar backlashes to identity 
commodification from populations, injecting authenticity into the national political discourse. 
National identity is developed geographically and influences a nation’s policy outcomes 
in either constitutive or regulative fashion. Constitutive refers to the creation or revision of actors 
and interests while regulative refers to the regulation of actor’s behavior. In a comparison of two 
post-Soviet republics, Latvia and Belarus, Tsygankov (2000) identifies domestic structures as the 
conduit through which a nation’s identity is formed over time. National identity effects are 
illustrated by examining the following societal indicators: history of national independence, 
ideology of policy networks, retention of native language, type of trade policies, strength of 
nationalist interest groups, access to international markets, exposure to outside threats to 
independence, and character of political leadership. He attributes the disparities in foreign trade 
policy outcomes, since the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991, to differing levels of national 
identity strength. Tsygankov (2000) suggests that a well-defined, autonomous conception of 
national identity contributes to more radical change from past economic patterns. And in contrast 
nations with weaker conceptions of national identity are less likely to break away from the 
influence of external actors. 
The 1959 regime change led by the Castro brothers in Cuba constituted a rejection of 
foreign ownership on the island, symbolized by the seizure of foreign property and 
nationalization of industry in lieu of new economic reliance on the Soviet Union and its allies. 
Up until that point in time, the Spanish, British, and Americans had physically, ideologically, or 
financially occupied Cuba over the last five hundred years. The Castro government represented 
Cuba’s first recent opportunity to develop an identity at the national level, albeit with the support 
of significant Soviet subsidies. Cuba’s turn to the Soviet Union was a rational outcome due to 
 39 
their historical lack of national autonomy, the failed liberal economic policies of the Batista 
regime, the strength of Fidel Castro’s political personality, and American’s widespread asset 
ownership threatening Cuba’s fragile independence. Re-engagement of US-Cuba diplomacy 
presents a unique case in exploration of national identity effects on trade policy given its strong 
trade relationship with the LMRR pre-embargo, continued trade relationship with Russia over 
the last fifty-five years, and its geographic isolation in the Gulf of Mexico. 
An Uncertain Future for Trade in the Gulf of Mexico 
The future for freight transportation in the Gulf of Mexico is dependent on the affect of 
the opening of Panama Canal in 2016, normalizing diplomatic relations between the US and 
Cuba, and the shifting production and consumption roles from non-Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) actors. Cuba is well situated within north-south 
American freight flows to capitalize on US freight transportation infrastructure (see Figure 6). 
Cuba’s central location in the Gulf of Mexico affords access to the Straits of Florida, Windard 
Passage in addition to Panamanian-US Gulf Coast freight flows. Figure 6 also highlights (in red) 
the location of main transshipment hub ports in the Caribbean like Freeport (Bahamas), Kingston 
(Jamaica), Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), San Juan (Puerto Rico), and Port of Spain 
(Trinidad and Tobago). Given their significant role in the hub and spoke approach towards 
shipping, Cuba has similar hub potential from a locational standpoint. In recent years the Cuban 
government has made significant investments in freight transportation infrastructure at the Port 
of Mariel to accommodate new growth (Macguire, 2013; Cave, 2014; Watts, 2014; Steel, 2015). 
The strategic location of Mariel, on the northwest coastline of Cuba, increases the port’s 
potential to serve as a transshipment hub for trade to and from the US. 
This close proximity to the US Gulf Coast also provides new incentives for US 
policymakers to change cabotage laws, which govern the movement of domestic- and foreign-
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flagged marine vessels between ports of call on domestic waterways. Currently, the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1920, often referred to as the Jones Act, governs shipping activity in the US and it 
was designed to protect domestic maritime shipping by restricting the penetration of foreign 
flagged vessels in US markets. The Jones Act also states that vessels operating in domestic 
shipping routes must be built in the US, owned by US citizens, and operated by a crew of US 
citizens or permanent residents. Expanded US-Cuba trade has operational and regulatory 
implications for the entire US shipping industry through the reduction of Jones Act restrictions 
and the lift of economic sanctions allowing direct US-Cuba vessel movements. This would 
encourage the expansion of Short Sea Shipping (SSS) operations in the Gulf of Mexico as US 
tourism, agricultural, industrial, and technology flows to Cuba increase, creating the necessary 
demand for services like container on barge shipping. SSS is defined as the movement of cargo 
and/or people by sea between ports along a coastline. Legislative action loosening cabotage laws 
can help the US fulfill its “America’s Marine Highway Program” (AMH) initiative of further 
developing SSS activity, outlined in the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act in addition 
to the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012. AMH has goals of increasing US 
economic competitiveness, mitigating roadway congestion, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
bolstering the domestic shipbuilding industry, and improving system resilience (MARAD, 2011). 
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Figure 5 Map of Gulf of Mexico port infrastructure and containerized freight flows (Vergé-Dépré, 
n.d.) 
What remains to be seen is the impact of relaxing US-Cuba embargo restrictions on Gulf 
of Mexico freight flows. Cui, Dodson, and Hall (2015) describe the decision-making process for 
trade issues as inherently politicized because of the visibility of industry activities, its multiple 
stakeholders, and the disagreement of policy goals at the local and national levels. International 
trade involves the physical movement of goods by truck, rail, ship, plane, and pipeline through 
marine and inland ports. Since trucks carry most goods on land, private citizen’s experiences 
with freight transportation is often characterized by its negative impacts such as roadway 
congestion, catastrophic accidents, and pollutant emissions; a similar argument could be made 
for rail as well. In addition to negative public perceptions, conflicting interests among key 
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stakeholders from the government, policy elites, citizenry, and industry experts further muddles 
freight transportation policymaking (Crow, 2010). And again, discordant policy agendas at the 
local level (land use and quality of life) and national level (economic development and 
environmental protection) contribute to mixed policy outcomes. But how are policy 
entrepreneurs from the US and Cuba affecting change inside the policy window?  
The issue of US-Cuba trade has become more ambiguous over the last decade as the 
economies of Cuba’s closest trade allies in Russia and Venezuela suffer through economic 
depression due in part to the global economic recession of 2008. Throughout the US embargo 
against Cuba until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba remained dependent on preferential 
trade agreements with the Soviets and their allies that amounted to a substantial economic 
subsidy. After the recession and economic reforms of the special period in the 1990s, Cuba 
secured another favored trade deal with Venezuela on the importation of oil. Once again, this 
deal was in effect a subsidy for the Cuban government because of their ability to re-export 
discounted Venezuelan oil at higher market prices. But the persistent low price of oil beginning 
in 2014 has weakened both the Russian and Venezuelan economies as well as Cuba whose oil 
subsidy has lost significant value (McAuley, 2014; Toro, 2015). Cuba’s economic troubles, the 
result of bureaucratic inefficiencies, chronic hard currency debt, and foreign direct investment 
deficiencies may induce economic policy reforms similar to those of the special period. This can 
already be seen in the gradual reforms from President Raúl Castro since assuming power in 2006 
(Pérez-Stable, 2010). Despite this progress, Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López (2013) describe the 
need for additional economic reforms to realize,  
“a high and sustained rate of economic growth, higher labor productivity, 
reduction in excess monetary liquidity, elimination of monetary duality, decrease 
 43 
in goods trade deficit, creation of private sector productive employment to absorb 
excess workers dismissed from the state sector, increases in real salaries and 
pensions, and improvement in the quality of social services.” (p. 25) 
Increased economic participation with the US is one component of a larger Cuban reform 
strategy. The growth of this relationship is dependent on policy change i.e. reduction and 
removal of the economic embargo. This study fills a research need in understanding the politics 
of economic policymaking in urban contexts through the lens of the individuals from major US 
seaports, the business community, government, logistics support industries, policy networks, and 
Cuban citizens, which have a vested interest in its outcome. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Research Question 
How does the behavior of policy entrepreneurs from the LMRR of the US and the 
Havana metropolitan area in Cuba influence economic policymaking inside a policy window to 
disrupt political economy activity? Lower Mississippi River economies are supported by the 
commercial activity of five ports located in Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Plaquemines, South 
Louisiana, and St. Bernard, which comprise the largest port complex in the US and the sixth 
largest in the world by tonnage (Big River Coalition, 2014). I selected the LMRR as a case study 
because it is one of America’s oldest commercial centers and as such provides a greater amount 
of historical documents to review (Yin, 2009). In particular, the region had strong trade ties with 
Cuba pre-1960 embargo. In the years leading up to the Castro revolution an estimated one third 
of the all cargo handled by the Port of New Orleans served Cuban markets (Robins and Trujillo, 
1999). Within the framework of this main research question, I developed a set of sub questions 
that guided my path of inquiry: 
 Why now? What recent focusing events have occurred to create a policy window for 
lifting the embargo? 
 Which types of behavior from policy entrepreneurs help couple the problem, policies, and 
politics streams? 
 How are policy entrepreneurs from the US and Cuba affecting change inside this policy 
window? 
 How does political economy theory explain the development of the Cuban economy 
throughout the twentieth century? 
 How can recurrent messages expressed by US and Cuban policy entrepreneurs be used to 
understand manipulation of the policymaking process towards a change in institutional 
behavior? 
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Responses to these sub-questions then provided the foundation for a greater discussion on 
the impacts of politically motivated actions on policy development. To complete this 
dissertation, I developed the following three research objectives that outline individual research 
tasks. 
 
Objective 1. Describe the impact of the US embargo on Cuba through trade analysis of the 
Cuban economy pre- and post-embargo. 
 
 Characterize US-Cuba trade flows before and after institution of the 1960 embargo 
 Catalogue past and current policies that govern the US embargo of Cuba 
 Determine major economic phases of the Cuban economy throughout the twentieth 
century to present day 
 Explore the current economic challenges facing Cuba and the obstacles to greater 
economic openness 
 
Objective 2. Review historical documents related to behavior of policy entrepreneurs in US-
Cuba relations. 
 
 Identify embargo-related historical documents from US and Cuban secondary sources 
(e.g. print/digital media, peer-reviewed articles, presentations, government records) 
 Develop a timeline of political, economic, and legislative events in US-Cuba relations 
 Use this events timeline to identify US and Cuban policy entrepreneurs 
 Identify policy entrepreneurs from literature on political economy theory 
 
Objective 3. Conduct qualitative analysis of policy entrepreneur behavior during an open 
policy window. 
 
 Conduct semi-structured interviews with representatives from major US seaports, the 
business community, government, logistics support industries, policy networks, and Cuba 
 Conduct content analysis of interview transcripts to establish common themes expressed 
by interview participants 
 Determine potential opportunities associated with expanding US-Cuban trade, 
specifically related to industry 
 Connect qualitative themes to larger narrative of political manipulation during 
opportunities for policy change 
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Research Design 
This study employed an explanatory sequential mixed methods approach. Explanatory 
sequential mixed methods involve the collection and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative 
data types. Because research activities occur in sequence, data is collected separately with two 
different units of observation. The quantitative unit of observation in this case study was trade 
value, while qualitatively, the unit of observation was the individual (Guest, Namey, & Mitchell, 
2013, p. 43). The research took place in three phases. Figure 1 describes the analytical 
progression beginning with quantitative data, which then informed qualitative data collection and 
analysis. Capitalization of the qualitative notation, “QUAL”, in Figure 4 indicates a greater 
emphasis on that phase, while the lowercase quantitative, “quan”, is emphasized less. Lastly in 
the interpretation phase, qualitative data results were used to provide a deeper understanding of 
the quantitative data results (Creswell, 2014, p. 224). 
quan    QUAL    interpretation 
Figure 6 Description of explanatory sequential mixed methods design 
In this study, quantitative data consisted of trade value analyses between the US and 
Cuba before and after the embargo. The intent was to quantify the magnitude of impact to the 
Cuban economy due to the embargo thus providing some clarity to the problem of continued 
economic isolation from the US. Data was acquired from secondary sources: US International 
Trade Commission, US Department of Commerce, United Nations Economic Survey of Latin 
America, US Department of Agriculture, and peer-reviewed journal articles. An examination of 
freight exchange revealed which commodities and industries suffered the greatest loss post-
embargo. These critical commodities and industries were then used to identify policy 
entrepreneurs, and subsequently informed the selection of participants for qualitative data 
collection. 
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Study Population and Sampling Approach 
The freight sector is made up of policy entrepreneurs at each stage of the supply-chain 
network. The shipment of commodities from producer to end consumer requires cooperation 
among logisticians, freight carriers, warehousers, customs brokers, seaports, labor, and 
regulatory agencies. I targeted representatives from the following groups to interview: major US 
seaports (e.g. port employees, stevedores), the business community (e.g. small-business owners, 
restaurateurs), government (state agencies), logistics support industries (e.g. freight forwarders, 
consultants), and policy networks (e.g. academics). I reached out to similar Cuban freight sector 
counterparts but I received no reply. In order to gain a Cuban perspective, I traveled to Havana, 
Cuba in the Spring 2016 and interviewed average Cuban citizens as well as a representative from 
the Havana policy network. Representatives from US seaports aided in understanding how 
freight flows affected urban development, understanding the impact of trade agreements and 
embargos, and identifying which industries stand to gain from a removal of the embargo. 
Government representatives provided insight into the policymaking process, the interplay 
between local, state, and federal jurisdictions, and the current political stance on US-Cuba 
relations. Input from the business community contributed to understanding of private sector 
influence on trade, and helped identify key growth industries post-embargo. Interviews with 
individuals working in logistics support helped contextualize the US embargo of Cuba within the 
entirety of US trade interests and also aided understanding the impact of policy change on 
logistics business operations. I used content from the interviews to gain a better understanding of 
freight flows between the US and Cuba as a result of economic sanctions. Academics within US 
and Cuban policy networks provided insight into the temporal aspect of the normalization 
process and the social motivations behind this effort. Lastly, interviews with Cuban citizens 
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illuminated their lived experience in Cuba under the influence of two national governments, 
Cuba and the US. 
Potential study participants were identified using a purposive snowball sampling 
approach. I developed an initial list of relevant individuals and organizations from the literature 
on political economy. Next I solicited referrals for additional study participants based on their 
professional and social networks. The sample size was considered sufficient when I reached 
theoretical saturation from qualitative interviews, yielding 20 total interviews (Guest, Namey, & 
Mitchell, 2013, p. 59). 
In order to address the main research question this study 1. defined the characteristics of 
the policy window in US-Cuba relations 2. categorized policy entrepreneur behavior within this 
window, 3. described in what way their behavior contributed to the reduction of sanctions, and 4. 
assessed the effectiveness of each type of policy entrepreneur behavior. US-based interviews 
were limited to stakeholders from the LMRR to gain their perspective on policy entrepreneur 
behavior in a region of the US that is uniquely adept in the movement of bulk cargo, the basis of 
US exports to Cuba since 2000. Interview questions were designed to understand the impact of 
policy entrepreneurs’ actions in the context of the LMRR. This context was developed through 
descriptive questions related to region-specific immigration, special interest groups, political 
discourse, economic organization, and inter-organization relationships. It is the development of 
the LMRR context that reveals the unique contribution of its policy entrepreneurs in the 
changing US-Cuba relationship. 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
The second phase consisted of semi-structured qualitative interviews with stakeholders 
collected over a two-month span in 2016. Interviews either took place in-person or over the 
phone, lasting between thirty to ninety minutes in duration in English or in Spanish. I employed 
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the ethnographic interview technique developed by James Spradley. Spradley’s (1979) approach 
is based on twelve essential interview elements shown in Table 1. Interviews begin with formal 
or informal greetings depending on the familiarity between interviewer and interviewee. In step 
2, the interviewer gives ethnographic explanations in plain language to the interviewee that 
describe the overall research project and its explicit purpose as well as details about the interview 
process with explanations of questions, recordings, native language, and interviews. The intent of 
these first two steps is to create a safe environment for the subject to openly share their 
experience while understanding that the interviewer plays an active support role in guiding 
discussion topics. Each interviewee received a letter of consent before the start of the interview 
either read aloud in-person or emailed for phone interviews. All content was recorded with an 
audio recording device and later transcribed. 
Semi-structured interviews involve asking ethnographic questions labeled as descriptive, 
structural, or contrast (Step 3). Generally ethnographic questions are designed to be open-ended 
to allow the subject flexibility to respond in any way desired. In this study questions were 
designed to gain a better understanding of policy entrepreneur behavior in the freight 
transportation sector including manipulation of information, and individuals, and institutions. 
Interview guides contained 10-15 potential questions. Interviews were conducted in English or 
Spanish depending on participant’s preference.  
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Table 2 Elements in the Ethnographic Interview (Spradley, 1979) 
Step # Action Item 
    1 Greetings 
2 Giving ethnographic explanations 
2.1 Giving project explanations  
2.2 Giving question explanations 
2.3 Giving recording explanations 
2.4 Giving native language explanations 
2.5 Giving interview explanations 
3 Asking ethnographic questions 
3.1 Asking descriptive questions 
3.2 Asking structural questions 
3.3 Asking contrast questions 
4 Asymmetrical turn taking 
5 Expressing interest 
6 Expressing cultural ignorance 
7 Repeating 
8 Restating informant’s terms 
9 Incorporating informant’s  
10 Creating hypothetical situations 
11 Asking friendly questions 
12 Taking leave 
  
 
Coding Methods 
Transcribed interviews were analyzed using a color-coded categorization technique 
(Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006). This multi-stage technique begins with multiple reviews of the 
transcript to obtain a greater understanding of its content. Next the researcher develops general 
categories for different types of information encountered in the text. Each category is then 
assigned a specific color. Thereafter the researcher reads through the transcript again and 
physically highlights sections in the text that can be organized under one of the aforementioned 
categories using the appropriate color. Typically researchers highlight re-occurring folk words, 
specific places, subject sentiments, and any other information pertinent to the research questions. 
Once the transcript has been thoroughly highlighted for categorical information, the 
highlighted text is then separated from the original document and re-organized by category in a 
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new document. This re-organization of highlighted content is accomplished via word processing 
software. Based on these categories and highlighted content, the researcher searches for 
reoccurring themes that can be developed into larger patterns describing the over-arching 
phenomenon, in this case policy entrepreneur behavior. A qualitative interview typically contains 
three main patterns that are supported with quotations from the transcript previously identified 
through the highlighting process. These patterns were used to address research questions and to 
develop conclusions and recommendations about the influence of policy entrepreneurs on the 
policymaking process. 
Secondary Data 
Embedded within the second phase, I reviewed secondary data sources from popular 
media in the US and Cuba using a confirmatory approach. The confirmatory approach involved 
reviewing documents using a pre-determined set of categories related to policy entrepreneur 
behavior. This was done to test the applicability of the MSA in explaining the current policy 
window in US-Cuba diplomatic relations opened by US President Barack Obama and Cuban 
President Raúl Castro on December 17, 2014 (Guest, Namey, & Mitchell, 2013, p. 256). In 
further evaluation of MSA theory, this study classified the years following Cuban revolution as 
an open policy window that provided the necessary conditions for the adoption of the embargo 
from both US federal executive and legislative branches. Potential information sources include 
newspapers, blogs, city government press releases, business records, demographic information, 
and advertisements. Popular regional media sources like newspapers and press releases will help 
recount the national mood, external pressures, problem magnitude and the progression of events 
leading up to the sweeping change in foreign policy from US and Cuba perspectives. 
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Methods Rationale 
The rationale for using an explanatory method was its requirement for a guided approach 
to qualitative data collection. Initial interviews revealed insider terminology that I then used to 
refine interview questions. The quantitative data helped me identify specific commodity flows 
that could shift through Cuba. Based on those potential flows I was able to select my sampling 
method and to draft trade specific interview questions. Multiple streams approach was the most 
suitable theoretical model for this case study because it describes how opportunities for policy 
change are created under ambiguous conditions (Zahariadis, 2014, p. 26). It will take executive 
and legislative action to fully remove the embargo and MSA helps explain that process based on 
the combination of existing problems, potential policy solutions, and present political will to 
enact said solutions. 
Recruitment Method 
I recruited participants from major US seaports, the business community, government, 
logistics support industries, policy networks, and Cuban citizens using an investigator-initiated 
and socially-based recruitment technique as described by Guest, Namey, & Mitchell (2014, p. 
68). Interviews were conducted either in person or over the phone and were recorded with a 
digital audio recorder. I used a third party transcription service with strict privacy policies to 
produce interview transcripts. I kept email correspondence through the completion of my 
dissertation and then I deleted them. I will keep audio files and interview transcripts for a period 
5 years from completion of my dissertation at which point I will delete all files and shred any 
hard copies of transcripts used in the coding process. 
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I recruited port representatives via targeted email solicitations based on existing 
relationships via past project collaborations and networking events. I enlisted participants from 
the business community and logistics support providers via connections with organizations 
interested in maritime shipping like the World Trade Centers Association, regional chambers of 
commerce, New Orleans Business Alliance, Louisiana Economic Development, and the 
International Freight and Customs Brokers Association of New Orleans. (IFFCBANO). I 
recruited participation from government representatives via targeted email solicitation based on 
contacts from the University of New Orleans Transportation Institute. I used similar email 
solicitation methods to recruit academics in US-Cuba policy networks. While traveling in Cuba, 
I relied on my host’s kinship networks to recruit participants. 
Validity 
In explanatory sequential mixed methods, both quantitative and qualitative studies should 
be valid in their own right. I must use quantitative study results to inform the plan for qualitative 
data collection. In this study quantitative analysis guided the development of interview questions. 
The strength of the sequential explanatory mixed methods is that qualitative interviews will be 
guided by the results of quantitative economic analyses. 
Creswell (2014) argued for the inclusion of validity strategies in qualitative research 
designs beginning in the proposal development phase. To increase study validity I used 
triangulation of different participant perspectives to support my selection of themes. 
Additionally, I have clearly presented my own biases as the lead researcher by discussing my 
personal relationship with Caribbean nations. This study incorporated feedback from an external 
reviewer, also referred to as peer debriefing, to ensure validity within disparate audiences. In 
terms of reliability, this study follows the methodology described by Yin (2009), which 
advocates for detailed documentation of each step in the research process to increase consistency 
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and stability. I also reviewed transcripts for mistakes and developed clear definitions for theme 
categorization as described by Gibbs (2007) to improve study reliability. 
Limitations 
Potential challenges of an explanatory sequential mixed methods approach include an 
increased time commitment. Phase 1 must be completed before phase 2 can begin, so the overall 
research timeline is extended, in contrast to convergent parallel mixed methods design where 
phase 1 and phase 2 are conducted concurrently. I interpreted results of phase 1 and phase 2 
analyses in the discussion section of my report (Creswell, 2014, p. 225). The intent of this 
interpretation is to understand the influence of policy entrepreneur behavior on the policymaking 
process. The main limitation of the MSA is that it is still relatively new compared to other 
theories and it has not been fully confirmed through repeated scientific testing. MSA has also 
been criticized for focusing too much on the individual at the expense of analysis of the 
institutional role in policymaking. Questions also remain as to whether multiple streams theory 
can be supported by quantitative data. 
Significance 
This research contributes to the field of economic development policy by investigating 
how specific individuals and groups can produce policy change in moments of political unease. 
MSA provides a framework for understanding how messages are developed and expressed to 
policymakers with decision-making authority. In the absence of a well-defined problem, the 
power of policy entrepreneur’s message of policy failure is amplified. My results suggest that a 
small number of motivated actors at the individual, state, and national levels of society 
employing political, economic, and symbolic actions contributed to the opening of the current 
policy window and the succeeding reduction of sanctions. This work lends empirical support to 
Zahariadis’s (2003, 2005) argument that issue salience plays a larger role in influencing 
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institutional behavior than characteristics of an issue. This dissertation also supports the notion 
that MSA can illuminate the connection between domestic and foreign policy development by 
describing how policy entrepreneurs work within existing ideological frameworks to change 
narratives. In this way, policy entrepreneurs focus the political debate within a policy window on 
the loss of economic opportunity, an issue fundamental to American national identity. This 
places the burden of policy failure on the federal government and creates a need for action in the 
name of rationale. My study contributes to MSA theory by evaluating policy entrepreneur’s use 
of information to build narrative in support of specific policy action. 
Role as a Researcher 
As the primary researcher in this study, I am the child of Caribbean immigrants to the 
US. Although born and raised in the US, I have traveled to several Caribbean islands over the 
years including Aruba, Barbados, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and St. Martin. A portion of my 
family originates from the Dominican Republic, a former Spanish colony similar to Cuba. At the 
same time, I my research focus in freight transportation and economic development places me in 
a position of conducting research on the impacts of international trade and freight movements. I 
have received an academic fellowship from the US Department of Transportation to complete 
my dissertation. 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
History of the Cuban Economy 
 
 
US-Cuba Trade Pre-Embargo  
The structure of US-Cuba relations pre-embargo was defined by the inclusion of the 
Teller Amendment in the 1898 Congress joint resolution that prohibited US annexation of Cuba, 
the conclusion of the Spanish-American War later that year that ended Spain’s occupation of 
Cuba, the inclusion of the Platt Amendment in 1901 that permitted US military intervention in 
Cuba, and the subsequent passage of the Reciprocity Treaty in 1902 that officially granted Cuban 
Independence. These events safeguarded an enduring US presence in Cuba, which could be 
protected thru military force when deemed necessary. Thus US firms gained economic 
confidence in Cuban markets and actively sought to deepen trade relations. This close economic 
relationship persisted until the 1959 military coup led by Fidel Castro that proved to be a tipping 
point relations embodied by the US embargo of Cuba that remains in effect today (Table 3). 
Pre-embargo, the commodities of particular interest to the US market were sugar, rum, 
tobacco, and offseason fruits and vegetables that translated into preferable tariff reductions on 
US agricultural exports to Cuba including lard, salted and smoked meats, vegetable oils, wheat 
flour, rice, potatoes, onions, feedstuffs, and lumber (Wakefield, 1937, p. 128). Of these traded 
commodities, sugar had the most influence over the performance of the Cuban economy. During 
the early twentieth century, the Cuban economy experienced drastic periods of growth and 
recession as a result of shifting global supply and demand for sugar. By 1920 US investors 
owned 62 of the 96 sugar refineries in Cuba and as American ownership increased, Cuban sugar 
exports to the US received increasingly favorable tariff reductions (Copeland, Jolly, & 
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Thompson, 2011). The close trade relationship with the US proved lucrative for Cuba, as it 
posted positive trade balances from 1914-1935 in all but one year, 1921 (p. 116). 
Table 3 Timeline of significant events in US-Cuba relations (USITC, 2001; Hufbauer, 2011; 
Copeland, Jolly, & Thompson, 2011) 
 
Simultaneously, Cuban economic dependence on the US grew; meaning the passage of 
US legislation promoting trade liberalization or protectionism had greater impacts to the island 
economy. Table 4 and Table 5 display the share of Cuban imports and exports activity by top 
Year Event
1898 US defeats Spain in Spanish-American War, ending Spanish occupation of Cuba
1902 US Congress passes Reciprocity Treaty establishing Cuban independence
1952 Fulgencio Batista leads military coup and seizes control of the Cuban government 
1959 Fidel Castro assumes control of Cuban government, Batista flees Cuba
US recognizes new Cuban government under Fidel Castro
Cuba passes Cuban Agrarian Reform Law that seizes US owned plantations without compensation
1960 Cuba signs trade agreement with Soviet Union
US imposes embargo on exports to Cuba and ends sugar import quotas from Cuba
1961 US and Cuba break diplomatic relations
US-backed Brigade 2506 attempts military coup in Bay of Pigs, Cuba and fails
US Congress passes Foreign Assistance Act
1962
US Congress passes Cuban Assets Control Regulations
1963 US invokes Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 to freeze Cuban assets in the US
Organization of American States implements trade sanctions and severs diplomatic relations with Cuba
1975 Organization of American States removes collective sanctions against Cuba 
1982 US bans business and tourist travel to Cuba
1989 Soviet Union collapses sending Cuban economy into recession
US and Cuba cooperate to curb drug trafficking in the Gulf of Mexico
1992 US Congress passes Cuban Democracy Act
1996 US Congress passes Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton Act)
2000 US Congress passes Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act 
2006 Raúl Castro assumes temporary control of Cuban government as Fidel's health worsens
2008 Raúl Castro officially becomes President of Cuba
President Castro institutes reforms allowing modest forms of private ownership and employment
2009 US President Obama loosens restrictions on travel, remittances, and telecommunications
2014
2015 US announces regulatory changes to Cuba sanctions
Presidents Obama and Castro meet at the Summit of the Americas in Panama
US removes Cuba from list of state sponsors of terrorism
US and Cuba re-open embassies
Pope Francis visits Cuba
2016 US President Barack Obama visits Havana, Cuba and delivers speech supporting end of the embargo
Soviet Union delivers ballistic missiles to Cuba prompting the US to establish a military blockade in 
what would be called the Cuban Missile Crisis
US President Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro deliver speeches about effort to normalize 
diplomatic relations
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trade partners between 1913-1936. The US, United Kingdom (UK), Spain, Germany, France, and 
British India were the largest Cuban trade partners (descending) at that time. At its peak in 1921-
1922, the US accounted for 67.9 percent of Cuban imports by value (US dollars). The percentage 
of Cuban exports to the US was even more skewed, reaching a high of 85.5 percent in 1922-
1923. Overall during this period, the US averaged a 59.7 percent share of Cuban imports and 
76.8 percent share of Cuban exports. The next closest trading partner in terms of value was the 
UK that averaged a 5.5 percent share of Cuban imports and 12.8 percent share of Cuban imports. 
The US was Cuba’s largest trade partner by far leading up the start of World War II. But this 
dependence also left Cuba vulnerable to politically motivated economic policy decisions from 
the US. 
Table 4 Cuban imports from principle trade partners, 1913-1936 (Wakefield, 1937) 
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Table 5 Cuban exports to principle trade partners, 1913-1936 (Wakefield, 1937) 
 
US policy actors’, manipulation of trade policy in the early twentieth century contributed 
to significant economic fluctuations in the Cuban economy. Pre-embargo, US congressmen were 
the most influential policy entrepreneurs influencing US-Cuba relations. One of the earliest 
examples of this influence was the inclusion of the Teller Amendment in the 1898 US 
declaration of war against Spain that barred annexation of Cuba. The purpose of the amendment 
was to protect US sugar beet farmers from competition with Cuban sugar; an important issue for 
Senator Henry Teller who represented Colorado sugar beet farming interests (Library of 
Congress, n.d.). Subsequently, the Organic Act of 1900 (Foraker Act) further restricted US 
investment in Cuban plantations diminishing the production of tobacco and other agriculture 
products. Despite the occupation restrictions outlined in the Teller Amendment, the Platt 
Amendment of 1901 granted the US an indefinite land lease in Guantanamo Bay and also 
established the US’ right to intervene in Cuban affairs to defend life and property interests 
(Wakefield, 1937, p. 126). The Cuban economy grew as result of preferential trade with the US 
but the passage of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act raised average US import tariffs leading to 
a global rise in tariffs by other nations and cost of living increases in the American agricultural 
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sector. The Great Depression of 1929 drove US immigrants from Cuba and the ensuing passage 
of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in1930 hurt the Cuban sugar, tobacco and citrus trade. Import 
tariffs were set at 14 percent for sugar and an average rate of 69 percent for other agricultural 
products (Copeland, Jolly, & Thompson, 2011). By the end of the 1930’s the world’s major 
economic powers were preparing for what would be World War II, while political instability 
began to spread across Cuba due in part to the rising influence of Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar, 
Cuba’s top policy entrepreneur for the next three decades (American Experience, 2004). 
Throughout the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s US foreign investment and the policies of 
politico Batista and his associates defined the Cuban economy; ushering in an age of 
extraordinary government spending on economic development but producing few realized 
returns for the Cuban people. As explained by American Experience (2004), Batista first served 
as president from 1940-1944, but it was not until he launched a coup and seized control of the 
Cuban government during the 1952 elections that he was able to institute his economic vision. 
The Constitutional Act of 1952 granted Batista far-reaching powers to legislate, punish by 
execution, suspend rights for national security purposes, and it further centralized government 
power in Havana (McGuigan, 2012, p. 100). 
The Batista-led government embraced trade liberalization by re-committing to GATT 
membership, negotiating new trade agreements with Europe and Latin American nations, and 
reduced taxes by 2 percent on foreign remittances. Batista’s economic policies were influenced 
by Keynesianism, which supported government intervention to stimulate demand. This plan 
would eventually be known as the Programa económico mínimo. This spending came in the 
form of large public works projects, diversification of non-sugar related agriculture production, 
and the provision of low-rate credit and working capital for other economic development 
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projects. Increased US tourism was also seen as a way to diversify the economy and Batista 
invested significant public money into expanding the hotel and gaming industries under the 
guidance of know American mafioso Meyer Lansky, who served as gambling reform advisor (p. 
159). But internally, the Batista economy was rife with wasteful public works projects (of which 
he benefitted personally), corruption, political cronyism, and disenfranchisement of the general 
Cuban public (McGuigan, 2012, pp. 308-316). By 1953 Cuban exports to the US were on the 
decline (down 30 percent from 1951), sugar prices were falling, unemployment rose from 8.4 
percent to 25 percent, and the Net National Product was on the decline as seen in Figure 7. Social 
unrest grew and on July 26 a group of insurgents, directed by Fidel and Raúl Castro, led an 
unsuccessful attack against Moncada Barracks, signifying rising the dissatisfaction with Batista. 
 
Figure 7 Cuban Net National Product (NNP) from 1948 to 1958 (McGuigan, 2012, p. 139) 
The Batista regime had many economic shortcomings from 1952-1958 that contributed to 
its eventual end including the increase in national debt to more than 50 percent of GDP, 
reduction of cash and gold reserves, decline of average per capita income, and chronic 
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unemployment. McGuigan (2012) argues that the end of Batista’s rule in 1958 was a direct result 
of his prioritization of economic development programs at the expense of bolstering defenses 
from Castro’s military advances. By 1958 the unemployment rate had jumped from 8.9 percent 
to 18 percent causing greater social unrest and shifts in support for Castro (p. 307). Batista’s 
struggles economically and politically reflected poorly towards the rest of the world, eventually 
leading the US to withdraw its support (American Experience, 2004). 
At the time of Batista’s resignation in 1958, the US comprised 67 percent of Cuba’s 
exports and 70 percent of its imports and it was estimated that the US operated 75 percent of 
arable land in Cuba. On the US side Cuba accounted for 3 percent of US exports and 4 percent of 
imports (USITC, 2001, p. 3-1; Copeland, Jolly, & Thompson, 2011). According to Hufbauer et 
al. (2011) the US government initially recognized Fidel Castro as president. However Castro’s 
‘revolutionary law’ called for the mandatory 30 percent labor share of profits, and the 
nationalization of the telephone and electric utilities. Next, the Cuban Agrarian Reform Law of 
1959 seized US owned plantations, which was followed by Castro’s signing of new trade 
agreements with the Soviet Union for the sale of sugar and other products in exchange for Soviet 
crude oil in 1960. This prompted US President Dwight D. Eisenhower to end most of its Cuban 
sugar quotas and oil exports, provoking Castro to seize most US property on the island (sugar 
and fruit companies, oil refineries, utilities, banks). Finally in October of 1960, the US enacted 
broad economic sanctions against Cuba codified into law in 1962 with the passage of the Foreign 
Assistance Act, section 620(a) (Hufbauer et al., 2011; USITC, 2001). Presidents Fidel Castro and 
Dwight Eisenhower were the most significant policy entrepreneurs of this revolutionary period 
contributing to the opening of a policy window in US-Cuba relations that came to be defined by 
an economic embargo. 
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The Embargo Effect  
It is difficult to assess the economic impact attributed solely to the US embargo of Cuba. 
The difficulties in measuring the embargo’s impact are attributed partly to Cuba’s non-market 
economy, reliance on assistance from foreign trade partners, lack of data reporting to institutions 
like the IMF, incompatibility of Cuban economic data with international standards, and the 
complications of a ‘dual’ currency economy dealing in ordinary Cuban pesos (CUP) and 
convertible pesos (CUC). The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) (2001) 
argues that three additional economic factors have contributed to the performance of the Cuban 
economy in the latter half of the twentieth century: the economic collapse and breakup of the 
Soviet Union, concurrent multilateral sanctions from other organizations, and Cuba’s own 
domestic policies (pp.1-4, 1-5). 
Table 6 US exports and imports to Cuba and the rest of the world from 1957-1964 (USDOC, 1967) 
 
 US-Cuban trade was already on the decline before establishment of the embargo that saw 
US exports to Cuba drop 59 percent over two years starting in 1958 as seen in Table 6. US 
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imports from Cuba also suffered a similar but less steep decline over that time. The immediate 
effect of the trade embargo was to continue that decline, which was accelerated due to additional 
conflicts like the Soviet missile crisis in 1962. Impact to US economy was negligible outside of 
initial property losses, as the US found alternative import and export partners to replace Cuba’s 
contribution (Bennett, 2004; USITC, 2001). Cuba’s new trade relationships with the Soviet 
Union, China, Eastern and Western Europe, Canada, Latin America and other nations quickly 
supplanted its former trade activity with the US (see Figure 8 and Figure 9). Between 1958 and 
1963 the US’ share of Cuban exports fell from 67 percent to zero while import suffered a similar 
fate falling from 70 percent to zero. 
The Cuban economy increasingly diversified its trade partners after establishment of the 
US embargo in 1960, as evidenced by new trade agreements on sugar Spain, France, and the UK. 
Initially, the US embargo affected the trading behavior of other nation’s with Cuba, as seen in 
Figure 8, where Western Europe and Canada’s share of Cuban exports temporarily reduced 
before returning to pre-embargo levels in 1963. Cuban imports from Latin America followed a 
similar pattern of temporary decrease and return to pre-embargo levels (Figure 9). Post-embargo, 
Eastern Europe and China opened up as an export markets for Cuban goods, while Western 
Europe, Canada, and China’s combined share of Cuban imports grew to rival that of the Soviets 
by 1963. 
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Figure 8 Share of Cuban exports to chief trade partners immediately before and after the US 
embargo, 1958-1963 (UN, 1963, p. 273) 
 
Figure 9 Share of Cuban imports to chief trade partners immediately before and after the US 
embargo, 1958-1963 (UN, 1963, p. 273) 
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The Post-Embargo Cuban Economy 1960-1989 
The post-embargo Cuban economy was defined by a deepening relationship with the 
Soviet Union, additional sanctions from the US and members of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), and modest domestic policy reforms. In 1962, the US revoked Cuba’s preferential 
tariff treatment and most favored nation status, increasing tariff rates on all Cuban goods. The 
passage of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations the following year froze all Cuban assets in 
America, prohibited financial and commercial transactions with Cuba, barred direct or indirect 
exports to Cuba, and barred direct or indirect imports from Cuba except $100 worth of specific 
goods. The OAS, established in 1948 as a regional alliance in the America’s, was comprised of 
21 original member nations including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, US, Uruguay, and Venezuela. OAS imposed diplomatic and 
economic sanctions against Cuba in 1964, further obscuring the economic impacts attributable 
solely to the US embargo. This trade barrier proved temporary as within a year, OAS members 
began to negotiate new trade deals with Cuba independently (USITC, 2001, pp. 1-5, 2-2). 
According to the USITC (2001) the 1970s brought a relaxing of sanctions against Cuba 
while the 1980s and 1990s were marked by tightened economic restrictions. OAS voted to lift 
multilateral sanctions against Cuba and the US followed suit, loosening restrictions on trade 
between US subsidiaries and Cuba, relaxing restrictions on American travel to Cuba, and signing 
agreements on anti-hijacking, fishing rights, and maritime boundaries. The US and Cuba 
established unofficial diplomatic relations signified by the opening of interest sections in 
Washington DC and Havana. The election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980 saw the US 
discontinue normalization efforts and reinstitute the American travel ban to Cuba with few 
exceptions. Senator Connie Mack’s (R-Florida) amendment, first introduced in 1989 that 
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renewed prohibition of US foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba, eventually passed in 1992 under 
the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) legislation (USITC, 2001; Copeland, Jolly, & Thompson, 
2011). Throughout this ebb and flow of sanctions, the Soviet Union’s influence remained a 
stabilizing force in the Cuban economy.  
Cuba remained heavily reliant on its benevolent trade relationship with the Soviet Union 
from 1959 to 1989; a position that would prove detrimental with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. In 1972 Cuba joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and 
signed agreements with member nations that guaranteed above market prices for Cuban goods, in 
effect creating an export subsidy for their economy (p. 3-6). Created as an alternative to US 
Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II (WWII), the CMEA was directed by the 
Soviet Union and it included at various times the following official members: Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Albania, East Germany, Mongolia, Cuba, and 
Vietnam. Over the next decade, the USITC (2001) estimates that Cuba was receiving $6 billion 
in annual economic assistance from the Soviets (p. 1-9). Cuba tourism declined greatly as a 
result of the US travel ban, of which tourism from the Soviet bloc nations could not replace. To 
address the lagging tourism sector, the Cuban government passed Decree Law 50 in 1982 that, 
for the first time under Castro, allowed joint ventures between foreign private investors (as 
minority partners) and Cuban government owned enterprises (p. 3-7). Decree Law 50 was the 
first step in a long path of economic reforms that would become known as the special period 
after the loss of Soviet economic assistance. 
The Breakup of the Soviet Union, 1990-1999 
The breakup of Soviet Union and the end of its economic support was devastating to the 
Cuban economy, causing recession and forcing the Cuban government to respond with economic 
reforms. Bain (2010) describes the political changes during the transition from the Soviet Union 
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to Russia, including disappearance of Marxism-Leninism from foreign policy, decrease in 
Cuba’s geopolitical significance, and embrace of a market economy under the first president of 
the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin (p. 131). At the time of the break up, Cuba was receiving 
somewhere between $4 billion-$6 billion in economic assistance from the Soviets (USITC, 2001, 
3-8). When that support stopped Cuba lost its stable supplier of credit, subsidized oil, agricultural 
equipment and other agricultural products as well as its largest export market. The economic 
fallout included a 54 percent reduction in Cuban agriculture production, the total collapse of its 
fishing industry, an estimated 40 percent loss of real GDP between 1989-1993, a two-thirds 
reduction in exports, and a three-fourths loss of imports (Copeland, Jolly, & Thompson, 2011; 
USITC, p. 3-10). Figure 10 shows the rapid decline in GDP growth rate from 1989 to a low of -
14.9 percent in 1993 (right-side axis). Mesa-Lago (2006) argues that the combined losses in 
GDP, foreign trade, and Soviet aid led the Cuban government to institute a temporary reform 
initiative termed the Special Period in Time of Peace, addressing Cuban domestic and 
international policies. 
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Figure 10 Cuban imports, exports, trade balance, and GDP from 1989-1999 (USITC, 2001, p. 3-11) 
The post-Soviet Union years in Cuba were a time of recession, reform, and recovery 
influenced by actions made during the Special Period in Time of Peace. The related reforms, 
passed mainly between 1993-1996, included,  
“legalization of the dollar and foreign remittances; decentralization of economic 
decisions and management both domestic and in external trade; transformation of 
state farms into cooperatives (UBPC), reopening of free agricultural markets, and 
distribution of small state land parcels to private farmers; reauthorization of self-
employment; insertion in the world trade market, opening to foreign investment 
and technology, authorization of joint ventures; expansion of tourism, etc” (Mesa-
Lago, 2006, pp. 161-162) 
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Though novel for the Castro regime, Mesa-Lago (2006) describes these reforms as falling short 
of similar recent liberalization efforts made by China, Vietnam, and Eastern European nations. 
For example, Chinese and Vietnamese reforms ended collective agriculture models and 
embraced household farms and less restricted agricultural markets, while Cuba converted its 
state-owned farms into cooperatives (Unidades Básicas de Producción Cooperativa) lacking 
autonomy and the ability to compete in a competitive marketplace (p. 176). The agricultural 
reforms did succeed in shifting the control of farmland from the Cuban government to 
cooperatives and private farmers. After the Soviet collapse, economic instability led to a greater 
demand for foreign hard currency (US dollars) among the Cuban people and black markets 
where locals could exchange dollars for pesos developed. To combat this trend, the Cuban 
government decriminalized the use of foreign currency and in 1994 introduced the convertible 
peso, which institutionalized the dual currency economy. Business involving sugar and most 
other agricultural production, education, and healthcare deal in the original Cuban peso (CUP) 
while tourism and export-oriented agriculture production deal in convertible pesos (CUC). The 
CUC contributed to a tourism boom starting in 1994 that eventually overtook sugar production as 
the main hard currency generator (USITC, 2001, pp. 3-13, 3-24). 
 Other reforms in labor, finance, and governance contributed to Cuba’s economic growth 
in the latter half of the 1990s. Cuba legalized limited forms of self-employment that further 
reduced Cuba’s government spending on employment and limited its responsibility in providing 
some goods and services for the Cuban people. Over this time Cuba modernized its banking 
sector by switching to a digital system, installing automatic teller machines around the island, 
and establishing a new central bank, Banco Central de Cuba, in 1997. In an effort to improve 
fiscal management, the Cuban government cut spending on government-owned enterprises, 
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defense, and investment while re-introducing direct taxation and legalizing rental property. Cuba 
pursued increased participation in multi-national trade associations in the Caribbean 
(CARICOM), Latin America (Latina American Integration Association, Mercosur), and also sat 
in on negotiations between the European Union (EU) and Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries, though Russia remained Cuba’s largest trade partner. In 1992 Cuba authorized import 
activity by government-owned firms through constitutional amendment. Meanwhile Decree 
Laws 77 and 165 expanded foreign participation into the Cuban market. These two laws 
approved foreign investment in all Cuban sectors except education, healthcare, and defense, 
added more protections for foreign investors, approved joint ventures between the Cuban 
government and foreign firms, authored, industrial parks and free trade zones, and barred foreign 
companies from hiring Cuban labor directly. This labor provision added a new level of 
bureaucracy with the Cuban government acting as a middleman driving up the cost of Cuban 
labor compared to other Caribbean nations (USITC, 2001, pp. 3-15, 3-17, 3-22, 3-23). 
Despite its economic inefficiencies, special period reforms were effective in stabilizing 
the economy, as by 1994 GDP rate was again positive and trade imbalance was narrowed (Table 
7). Throughout this period, living standards remained stagnant due to Cuba’s dual currency 
system (CUP vs. CUC), lack of foreign direct investment, downsizing of the sugar industry, and 
persistent hard currency debt. The special period can be seen as continuation of 1980s economic 
policy that stressed import-substitution to support local industry and to conserve as much foreign 
hard currency as possible. 
US policy entrepreneurs at the national level were also active during the special period as 
Congress passed the CDA in 1992 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) 
Act of 1996 (Helms Burton Act) that further solidified the embargo into law and harmed the 
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Cuban economy in a time of instability (Lisio, 1996; Copeland, Jolly, & Thompson, 2011). 
USITC (2001) argues that this was the first time in the history of the embargo that Cuba felt the 
pain of US sanctions, due to the lack of Soviet subsidies to offset the effects of trade restrictions. 
CDA had a specific impact on trade flows in the Gulf of Mexico because it prohibited US-
subsidiary companies from trading with Cuba and it placed a 6-month moratorium on any ships, 
carrying goods or people, originating from Cuba destined for US ports. These two restrictions 
hindered Cuba’s ability to import food and medicine, and it forced Cuba to import goods from 
further away at a higher cost (p. 3-31). The Helms-Burton Act notably tied the lift of the 
embargo to the settlement of seized property claims, while also allowing Americans to bring 
legal suit against any entity profiting from use of seized property in Cuba; a stipulation that 
concerned foreign allies in the America’s and Europe that house US subsidiary companies 
actively trading with Cuba. 
Despite the negative impacts of these two pieces of US legislation, Cuba’s 
macroeconomic indicators show a clear rebound from recession towards the end of the decade as 
seen in Table 7. After three straight years of GDP decline, Cuban GDP grew at a rate of 6.3 
percent in 1999. Cuba also saw a reversal in the trend of negative inflation, tourist arrivals 
expanded rapidly with national revenue following a similar growth trend, exchange rates for the 
domestic peso stabilized. Foreign debts and trade balance remained relatively constant during the 
recession and recovery years. Based on these reforms, the US government once again pivoted on 
Cuba over humanitarian concerns and Congress passed TSRA in 2000, authorizing export of 
agricultural products, medicine, and medical products (Copeland, Jolly, & Thompson, 2011). 
The 1990s was a decade defined once again by national policy entrepreneurs with policymaking 
authority in the US and Cuban federal governments. 
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Table 7 Macroeconomic indicators for the Cuban Economy from 1989-1999 (USITC, 2001, p. 3-27) 
 
Modern-day Cuban Economy 2000-Present 
Recent national polling suggests that American perceptions towards Cuba are changing, 
even as some US political actors remain opposed to ending the embargo, which continues to 
distort a Cuban economy that has struggled in recent years. The CIA Factbook (2015) indicates 
that Cuban GDP is currently growing at an annual rate of 2.7 percent and is comprised of 
services (73.5 percent), industry (22.4 percent), and agriculture (4 percent). The Cuban 
government still exercises broad influence over the economy, exemplified by the 72.3 percent 
state-sector employment compared to 27.7 percent employment in non-state sector. Moreover, 72 
percent of the workforce is employed in the service sector, 18 percent in agriculture, and 10 
percent in industry. Unemployment remains low, estimated at 3 percent in 2015. Cuban 
commodity imports heavily outweigh exports at approximately $15.24 billion compared $4.41 
billion. Top imports include petroleum, food, machinery and equipment, and chemicals while 
Cuba’s main exports are petroleum, nickel, medical products, sugar, citrus, fish, tobacco, and 
coffee (Copeland, Jolly, & Thompson, 2011).  
Venezuela is currently Cuba’s largest import (38.7 percent of total) and export (33.5 
percent of total) partner. According the EIA (2015), Cuba produces less than a third of the oil 
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that it consumes making it a net oil importer. Their largest oil supplier is Venezuela, with whom 
they receive 115,000 barrels of oil per day at a discounted rate (oil subsidy). Cuba then re-
exports some of this oil on world markets at a profit, similar to past sugar-related agreements 
with the Soviet Union. Toro (2015) points out that the Venezuelan oil subsidy is worth more than 
$3.6 billion to the Cuban economy; higher than the $2.6 billion in revenue from tourism and the 
$3 billion in remittances from Cubans in the US. The recent decline in the global price of oil and 
its prolonged slump has hurt both the Venezuelan and Cuban economies. For the latter, this is a 
loss of a significant source of revenue and foreign hard currency crucial to the short-term 
viability of the Cuban economy. 
Beyond US economic sanctions, the USITC (2001) claims that the Cuban economy 
suffers from bureaucratic inefficiencies, outdated technology, dispirited labor, and foreign 
exchange shortages. Due to this confluence of political, social, and economic factors it remains 
difficult to project US-Cuba trade activity in the absence of the US embargo. It is estimated that 
with a lift of the embargo, the US would account for 17-27 percent of Cuba’s total imports and 
7-15 percent of total exports (p. 2-20). But for this shift to occur, Cuba would need to divert 
trade from current partners to the US minimizing the net impact to the Cuban economy. The 
USITC did find areas of significant opportunity for new foreign exchange flows within 
telecommunications, tourism, and foreign direct investment. 
In the coming years Cuba faces obstacles toward improved economic performance 
concerning demographics shifts, self-employment restrictions, ideological conflicts, and capital 
shortages. For the first time in many years, Cuba is experiencing a negative population growth 
rate due to, “low birth rates, high levels of ageing, and a sustained growth in the emigration of 
youth and qualified people.” (Hernández & Foladori, 2014, p. 38) Cuban entrepreneurs are some 
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of the highest skilled and lowest cost labor in the world, yet still struggle to find adequate 
opportunities for self-sufficiency because of outdated tax systems, technology, and infrastructure 
(Henken, 2016). The management of diplomatic relations with various policy entrepreneurs from 
the US, Russia, Venezuela etc. under President Raúl Castro will play a major role in shaping the 
Cuban trade flows (Mervyn, 2010). President Castro is currently Cuba’s most influential policy 
entrepreneur at the national level. Lastly, Bennett (2004) highlights the Cubans lack of foreign 
capital as a major hindrance to expanded trade with the US. New trade agreements would likely 
be the result of diversion from other partners until Cuba could attain greater access to credit or 
buildup their hard currency reserves through increased tourism and foreign remittances. 
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Chapter Five 
 
 
A Policy in Flux, Away from Economic Embargo 
 
 
The US embargo of Cuba is an economic policy that is currently in flux, a common view 
shared by interview participants. Within an MSA framework, present day US-Cuba relations are 
at a tipping point, where the policymaking process is especially vulnerable to influence from 
policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1995, p. 165). Interviews revealed that these policy entrepreneurs 
operated at three separate scales of society: individual, state, and national. Since 2000 they have 
acted purposefully to change the political, economic, and social relationship between the US and 
Cuba, which set the stage for the opening of a new policy window in 2014. Over this time, their 
actions can be organized into three categories: political, economic, and symbolic. The following 
qualitative results describe how these actions contributed to a change in the embargo policy. 
 
Policy Entrepreneurs at the Individual Level 
 
 
Individual policy entrepreneurs operate at the lowest level of organized policy advocacy; 
essentially how individual actions can help achieve a desired policy outcome. They are 
motivated by personally held beliefs and their thought processes are focused on impacting 
individuals through policy change. In the case of US-Cuba relations, qualitative interviews 
revealed five distinct types of individual policy entrepreneurs represented by Cuban 
entrepreneurs, Cuban historical exiles, pro-outreach Cuban Americans, recent Cuban immigrants 
to the US, and American businesspeople. They acted politically, economically, and symbolically 
in support of reductions to the embargo within open policy windows, while also seeking to 
influence public opinion while US policymakers’ attention on Cuban relations was low. 
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The ability of policymakers to accomplish US foreign policy goals is hindered by what 
Zahariadis (2014) refers to as problem load (p. 32). The number of complex problems on a 
changeable foreign policy agenda leads to information overload and in an effort to appear 
effective, forces policymakers to focus their attention to a small set of accomplishable policy 
solutions. This leaves more complex issues unresolved. Under that political setting, the Fidel 
Castro-led government has carefully cultivated a Cuban national identity based on revolution 
through the transformation of public space and control of mass media. This propaganda effort 
hinges on the perception of continual external threat and bureaucratic opacity, creating a culture 
of political uncertainty. One respondent, who was born in Cuba but now resides in the US, 
described the ideological environment as,   
…it's this revolutionary fervor.  The revolution was very moralistic.  You know, the () 
new man had to be the perfect man who would not need -- who would not be driven for 
the desire for consumption or commodities or would not enter into commodity exchange 
mechanisms, but would be driven for his fervor for the revolution and for the 
improvement of society.  So it's not a question of how much you are going to get paid to 
do this job. 
 
You want to do this job because it's what's good for the island.  So it's that sense of 
devotion and self-sacrifice that went along with this weird sexual repression. (Subject D)   
 
Just like under the Batista regimes of the 1950s, Castro’s revolution was very much connected to 
the economy. But unlike Batista, its message was a rejection of capitalistic ideals and the notion 
that individual satisfaction came from national collective benefit not self-gratification thru 
consumption. This sentiment was expressed in public media campaigns such as those shown in 
in figures 11 and 12. 
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Figure 11 Government media campaign in Cienfuegos, Cuba; English translation, “Our duty: 
Produce for the people!” (Griffith, 2016) 
 
Figure 12 Government media campaign in Viñales, Cuba; English translation, “To have more, we 
must start producing more” (Morganti, 2011) 
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The Cuban government’s campaign was the ideological opposite of American principles based 
the freedom of self-actualization thru political and economic participation. Consequently 
competing propaganda initiatives from both nations has skewed the perceptions of everyday life 
in Cuba and America. One participant recalled her first experience traveling to Cuba and 
significant difference between her perceptions and the reality, 
I got involved about 2000.  The fact that -- my interest was in the historic buildings in 
particular because Havana was one of -- was designated as one of the heritage cities in 
the world.  So, you know, that's why I went.  I am 68 years old and I grew up in an era of 
the Cuban missile crisis.  And you know, certainly being told by all the news media and 
my parents and everyone, you know, that the situation in Cuba was -- the Cubans were 
communists and, you know, not good people basically.   
 
…So my experience was when I got there, especially when I landed, I think the first time 
a person ever lands in a communist country that it sort of takes your breath away.  It's 
like, oh my god, what am I doing here?   
 
You know, what is all this about?  One of the first things that happened, the first time I 
went down I actually went with a mayor, ()…So I went down with him, my husband and 
I and a news reporter () and one of the city council members, we all went down 
together…So as I said, I went down there to look at buildings and, you know, absorb the 
architecture.  Well the first thing that I noticed was that it was nothing like I was 
expecting.  And when we went to the airport -- went through the airport, I noticed there 
was a VIP lounge.  You know, I was raised on this -- I get it, communism was everybody 
is alike, you know.  There are no VIPs.   
 
And here, there's a VIP lounge and we are escorted in there as VIPs coming in.  That was 
probably my first, you know, the veil was being lifted from my eyes.  And as I -- I spent a 
week there and by the end of the week -- in fact, probably by the end of the first 24 hours, 
I realized that Cuban people were lovely, charming people who love America, love 
everything American, wanted American clothes, wanted American music, wanted 
everything from there.  
 
They listened, you know, their radios were just regular AM radio stations.  You know, on 
a good night with good weather they could hear a baseball game from Miami broadcast.  
Just because they had been under a dictatorship and a communist regime, they have not in 
any way forgotten about what free trade is all about.  Everybody there wanted to sell you 
something, they wanted to create something for you…They wanted to earn money.  And 
it was just an amazing trip for me.  And at the end of the trip as we were going through 
the airport, I was talking to Mayor () and I -- you know, I was bugging him about, you 
know, why can't we do something about this?  Why don't we do this?  Why don't we do 
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that?  And he turned to me and he said, you do something about it.  And I said, well you 
know what, I think I will. (Subject G) 
 
In this passage, she communicated her surprise that Cuba had some nice facilities at the airport 
not unlike what she might find in America. She believed the Cuban people would be anti-
America, anti-capitalism but she realized they welcomed American tourists and the 
entrepreneurial opportunity that they represented. American journalists received similar 
treatment, enjoying the relative freedom to move about and document Cuban society, but in an 
exchange with one participant, they described the different ways the Cuban government 
maintained control,  
D:  Foreign journalists are -- once you get your visas, a journalistic visa, they're free to 
come and go. I don't get a sense -- when we went down with this group last year -- it was 
actually exactly a year ago -- we brought an embedded journalist from () and his 
cameraman.  And got him the visa which is hard to get quickly and they brought all their 
equipment with them and the only thing they were not allowed to bring into the country 
because you are not allowed to bring them into the country are walkie-talkies.  You can't 
even bring toy walkie-talkies with you because they could be used to incite a crowd. 
 
KG.  Oh. 
 
D:  You're allowed to have cell phones so it doesn't make any sense.   
 
KG:  Yeah, that's what I was just about to say. 
 
D:  This is an old restriction […] 
  
D: So anyway -- so no, they were not at all -- never communicated to me that they felt 
followed and went all around and filmed all around and interviewed lots of people.  So it 
was a good experience.  There's lots of journalists there now, not just from American 
publications but also international journalism.  Reuters has an agency as does AP.  Cuban 
journalists -- the interesting thing about their counterparts is that they are very smart, they 
are very well trained, and it's a very good journalism school, but the problem is that they 
don't -- to make the stuff public.  That's the problem. 
 
KG:  You can research all you want, but just --  
 
D:  And now there's an independent journalism movement that's working more with 
smaller communities and trying to empower the community through journalistic research 
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and primarily online stuff.  Though penetration is very low with the internet, it's better 
now than it was.  So it's growing. 
 
KG:  Okay.  And that actually kind of leads me to one of my last questions here, but more 
so if and when the embargo is lifted and different industries that are looking to -- which 
industries do you will gain?  I've read things about, you know, the telecommunications.  
You mentioned the rice growers.  
 
D:  You know Google was down there last year.  And apparently, and of course I don't 
know, but the word on the street is that they came in and they offered to wire the entire 
island. 
 
KG:  Really? 
 
D:  Yeah.  And that the island said no.  The government said no, which I understand 
perfectly -- 
 
KG:  Yeah. 
 
D:  -- because, you know, in a society that is predicated at maintaining control through 
state ownership and control, to give up something that would have such enormous 
repercussions from Cuban society to an American company makes no sense whatsoever.  
So they would rather struggle through what they're doing now which is a very phased in 
diffusion of the internet.  They've had a cable that comes from Venezuela that's very 
good.  It's a very good fast connection out of the east.  But they only hooked up certain 
government offices to those feeds and now it's slowly -- they're building public Wi-Fi 
spots.  You still have to pay, but at least you have it […].  So it's a fascinating 
phenomenon if you're walking down the street and you don't realize it's a Wi-Fi spot.  
They say, hey, mom, how are you?  People talking into their phones.  Crazy. 
 
Her statement is indicative of the Cuban government’s position towards reform. They will 
change policy at a pace that allows them maintain control. For example, internet is available at 
these aforementioned Wi-Fi hotspots but it must be purchased by the hour (2 CUC) from the 
government-owned telecommunications company Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba S.A. 
(ETECSA). But offices regularly lack sufficient supplies of Internet access cards (tarjeta de 
internet), each with a unique username and password. This unfulfilled demand has led to the 
creation of an informal Internet access code market. Any given day one can find someone selling 
unlicensed Internet access codes for 3 CUC in true capitalist fashion. 
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In addition to limiting the freedom of information, Subject I listed other forms of 
government oppression in more economic terms. Firstly, government salaries are insufficient to 
cover Cubans living expenses so many people are forced to work second jobs to make sends 
meet. Secondly, the lack of access to goods like household appliances, which even if they are 
available the price is often too high. Another respondent identified areas of the economy lacking 
adequate flexibility and support like entrepreneurship and real estate. Due to their geographic 
proximity the economic fate of Cuba is tied to the US in what one Cuban respondent called the 
“US lens”. He went on to express that if it was not for the strategic location of Cuba, “why 
would the rest of the world care otherwise?” (Subject Q) It is within this context that individual 
policy entrepreneurs took specific actions to demonstrate that the embargo had missed its 
intended mark; instead of undermining the Cuban government’s power, it had harmed the 
individual Cuban people.  
Cuban Entrepreneurs. The economic oppression of the Cuban people was reduced 
somewhat by economic reforms made by President Raúl Castro. They allowed for increased 
entrepreneurial activity and Cuban entrepreneurs capitalized on that opportunity. The creative 
ways in which Cubans earned supplemental income contributed to their role as policy 
entrepreneurs. Though the US embargo has reduced their access to goods and their own 
government has restricted their labor options, they continue to find ways to exploit every 
opportunity. 
In a dual currency system the best business opportunities are those involving tourists who 
spend the higher value CUC currency. One American respondent explained the economic impact 
of tourism in Cuba and the influence of Raúl, 
So under Castro, everybody in Cuba -- if you took the top of an economy and you 
crushed everybody down to a very, very low amount and you took everybody from the 
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bottom of the economy who was homeless and so forth and moved that up some, that's 
kind of what Cuba looks like today.  And so tourism doesn't fit with that kind of economy 
where everybody gets free medical care.  My friend's daughter has braces.  I don't know 
what it costs to have braces.  He paid nothing for that.  They have very good medical care 
and it does not cost them anything.  They don't have insurance down there because the 
government provides medical care.  I've been to Cuban schools.  Every kid has got a 
brand new uniform.  I mean, they look sharp in their uniforms.  They all have backpacks.  
Their schools are good.  That's all provided.  That didn't exist prior to the revolution and 
so forth. 
 
But going back to the economic part of it is that a Cuban who makes tips in a resort or 
something like that, you know, suddenly is living at a much higher standard than 
somebody who is a doctor or a university professor.  My first taxi driver on my first trip 
to Cuba from Jose Marti airport to the Hotel Nacional was a $17 taxi ride.  I gave him a 
$5 tip.  And I was paying in U.S. dollars so he said that would be $17.  And I gave him 
$17 and I handed him a 5.  And he looked back at me and he had tears in his eyes.  He 
said, two weeks ago I was a math professor supporting my wife and my two sons.  And I 
decided I couldn't do that anymore so I started driving a taxi.  He said, what you just gave 
me is what I earned in a week. 
 
So that's what tourism does to Cuba.  People in Havana right now who are involved in 
restaurants and all that kind of stuff are really doing very, very well.  People way out in 
the country where tour buses never go and that sort of stuff, they are still in the same 
Cuba that I first visited in 2000 because there has been no change for them at all.  We 
talked something about how Cuba creeped into tourism.  The first thing they did was they 
did joint ventures with hotel corporations from around the world.  The Malaya 
Corporation in Spain, the Golden Tulip Corporation in Amsterdam operates the (Park 
Exit 12) Hotel that's in Havana as an example.  These hotel corporations, none of them 
U.S. because our country won't allow U.S. corporations to do business in Cuba because 
that would be a violation of the trading with the enemy pact.  So all these other hotel 
corporations are moving in.  So some of the finest hotels you can find in the Caribbean 
right now are in Cuba because here's the deal on those joint ventures: the Cuban 
government owns 51 percent and the hotel corporation owns 49 percent.  The hotel 
corporation puts up all the money to build a brand new hotel or to renovate old hotels or 
whatever.  And they're partners.  And the entity within the Cuban government in which 
all these joint venture partnerships take place -- at one time I was tracking them, there 
were like 300.  There's probably more than that now.  -- is the Cuban military.  Who was 
the head of the Cuban military?  Raúl Castro.   
 
And so Raúl Castro was directly over the entity that was doing these joint venture things.  
And so he has a whole different view of the economy and capitalism than Fidel.  Fidel 
hated tourism.  Raúl sees the value of foreign investment in Cuba.  So they're able to 
benefit from that.  And so all of the things that are happening right now I think are a 
resulting fact that Fidel is no longer there and Raúl is there.  Raúl is more open to 
investments and so forth.  Cubans when they started getting into tourism, they turned to 
Cubans and they said, you know, would you like to have the ability to be able to have -- 
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because they needed hotel specs -- would you like to have people stay in your homes?  
Well you can do that, but you have to pay a flat fee per month and you've got to pay so 
much per people. (Subject F) 
 
Tourism injects capital into local economies quickly but here he also identified the uneven 
geographic distribution of that wealth based on access to tourists. Subject F’s narrative about the 
taxi driver also emphasizes the disruption that foreign currency has in the Cuban economy, 
which has remained reliant on foreign subsidies for survival. 
Recent economic reforms in the tourism industry have benefitted some Cubans; one of 
the most significant reforms being the legalization of casa particulares, Cuban bed and 
breakfasts. Casa particulares provide a new means of raising standards of living rapidly,  
B&B's make a lot of money by Cuban standards if you think about it.  They're very cheap 
by our standards because you can get a very nice room and lovely place for 35 CUC a 
night, 5 more CUC for breakfast if you want.  So it's not very much, but if you multiply it 
-- and you think, well, okay, these people have two or three rooms and their full all the 
time, that is a fortune.  Because Cubans do amazing things with very little -- with very 
few CUC.  Well, because the play the game.  And there's things that you buy in moneda 
nacional that are very cheap.  And then oil, cooking oil, doesn't exist doesn't exist in 
moneda nacional.  It has to be bought in CUC.  So there's things that you can only by in 
CUC, but there are things that you can buy in moneda nacional. (Subject D)   
 
This respondent also distinguishes between the purchasing power each Cuban currency. Some 
goods cannot be purchased in CUP, so this is another way certain people within the Cuban 
economy are marginalized economically. Other ventures where Cubans can earn CUC include 
passenger transportation (taxis, colectivos), art sales, restaurants, and repair shops. Figure 13 
shows typical signage advertising a private business in Cienfuegos, Cuba. 
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Figure 13 Small business sales advertisement in Cienfuegos, Cuba; English translation, “We sell – 
Carpentry equipment – Cages – Birds of all kinds” (Griffith, 2016) 
In recent years, the change in repatriation policy has also led to greater access to goods, 
But there's all sorts of different weird kind of arrangements going on.  So it's not only the 
money, it's also the goods because they ship stuff.  The latest -- Cubans are amazing -- 
the latest wrinkle in these complicated relationships is the phenomenon repatriation.  
Years ago when you left Cuba, you lost your rights as a Cuban citizen.  They never 
stopped considering you Cuban and you have to go on a Cuban passport, but it was a 
second class Cuba passport.  It's a Cuba passport that doesn't give you any of the rights of 
citizens to free healthcare, to a place to live, free education, that kind of stuff.  Now they 
will let you repatriate.  It cost a few hundred dollars, takes four or five months.  But then 
you have all the rights.  You have to have a place to live.  You can live with the family or 
someone.  But you have all the rights of a Cuban citizen and you can bring the contents 
of the household. (Subject D) 
 
Cuban entrepreneurs are themselves individual policy entrepreneurs within the MSA framework. 
Their resistance to economic despair caused by both the US embargo and the Cuban 
government’s overbearing economic policies, has exposed the failure of the political status quo. 
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The ability to survive through participation in both the formal and informal economies of Cuba 
for the last 55 years is a statement to policymakers that the only rational path forward is through 
reductions of the embargo. 
Cuban Americans. On the American side, some of the strongest individual policy 
entrepreneurs are from the Cuban exile community following the 1959 revolution. When they 
left the island, the new government seized their property and revoked their citizenship rights. As 
one Cuban participant currently living in Havana explained, after Fidel Castro came into power, 
the government re-distributed the homes to the Cuban people. But they did not own the homes 
and they had to pay rent until the “lease” was paid off. Today, after 50 plus years of living in the 
same home, many Cubans have paid off their housing contracts. Notwithstanding, the lack of 
housing options forces multiple family generations to live in the same home, which hinders their 
ability to relocate in search of economic opportunities. 
The Cuban exile community is uniformly against any normal relations with Cuba until 
the government undergoes a complete political transformation. As policy entrepreneurs their 
actions are mainly political. Due to their unified voice in opposition of the Castro regime, they 
have dominated the public debate on US-Cuba relations. One Cuban American participant 
characterized their political position as, 
…you know, most of the Cuban born folks that settled in New Orleans after the 
revolution, they came right after the revolution.  They were the elite of Cuba.  They were 
folks that had lost a lot.  Or sometimes even when they hadn't lost a lot, they had lost a lot 
symbolically because the richer people already had their money abroad.  But they could 
have lost land, property, houses, you know, what have you.  Those folks remain for the 
most part inflexible.  It's what we call the historical exiles who came right after the 
revolution who were from privileged families.  They remain inflexible insofar as they 
believe that doing anything but -- doing anything with Cuba while the Castros are alive is 
unethical, A; and B, Cuba needs to adopt a full democracy before they are willing to even 
consider any opening.  Those are the historical exiles.  There are very few left now. 
(Subject D) 
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This account describes how this group of Cubans suffered political (regime change), economic 
(property seized), and symbolic (way of life in Cuba) losses in the 1959 revolution. She also 
points to the role socio-economic class played in generating feelings of lost societal status. This 
shared experience helped to organize and unite the community around a common policy position. 
An American participant from the freight transportation sector discussed the extent of the 
historical exile community’s influence,  
…you ran a topic up the flagpole and gauged how they reacted to it, that they were so 
vehemently opposed it kind of went away. And I think as time goes on the people that 
were most affected by Castro and everything that happened, well they’ve gotten older and 
a lot of them have passed away. And the younger generation doesn’t have quite the strong 
negative feelings that maybe their parents did. They just kind of accepted that, ‘this is 
how I grew up’ and they’ve never been to Cuba so they don’t know. And so I think what 
you’re seeing is that political antagonism is diminished somewhat. (Subject W)  
 
Many participants shared a similar belief that the national mood on US-Cuba relations had 
slowly changed in recent years. Another American respondent stated his thoughts about the 
growing divide between public opinion and historical exile’s position, 
Here’s what I discovered just a few years ago, that the average person in the US did not 
care whether or not we had relations with Cuba. Opening up Cuba was not important to 
the average person, what was important to keep the door closed were two huge voter 
blocks in South Florida and in New Jersey. Those are the anti-Castro people that wanted 
the US to not normalize relationships with Cuba until Cuba did something to repay them 
for everything they lost… And so this big gigantic anti-Cuba, very powerful voter 
constituency in the US and these were smart people too. In Louisiana we had something 
like 700 families involved in the sugar cane business, in Florida its big corporations that 
are owned by Cuban-Americans and they were also big political contributors and so 
forth. So you have, in the US, a very strong anti-trade with Cuba anti-relationship 
movement with Cuba nobody was for ending it. (Subject F) 
 
Not only were these individual policy entrepreneurs influential in voting but also they were able 
to affect the political process through campaign contributions. Theirs has been the dominant 
voice within the politics stream in America to ensure the continuation of embargo. 
 88 
Pro-outreach Cuban Americans. Not all Cuban Americans share the historical exile’s 
position. These Cuban American policy entrepreneurs have seemingly received less publicity 
than their counterparts but their goal is to educate the American public about Cuba and to 
increase outreach to the Cuban people. They work at the local level of policy advocacy, “just 
pushing, pushing, pushing” to change the dominant public narrative against normal US-Cuba 
relations (Subject D). To that end, these policy entrepreneurs organize regular trips to Cuba for 
Americans, which are political in their cultural exchange and symbolic in their defiance of the 
embargo’s travel restrictions. Travel between Cuba and US has become commonplace for a 
relatively new type policy entrepreneur, recent Cuban immigrants. 
Recent Cuban Immigrants. The visibility of more established Cuban Americans in the US 
has overshadowed the existence and influence of recent Cuban immigrants. They are younger 
and they are not necessarily fleeing political oppression. Like immigrants from other countries, 
these policy entrepreneurs are coming to the US in search of greater economic opportunity, but 
they travel back forth from the US to Cuba frequently. In the following exchange, one Cuban 
American participant discussed the impact of recent immigrants and how they have supported 
the normalization process, 
D: …it's interesting because of the younger generations, I mean, we're not -- we just don't 
have that many Cubans.  It's not like Miami.  In Miami -- well, just put a break there 
before going to Miami.  What I've seen recently is that there has been a slight increase in 
the number of Cubans.  And it's hard to decipher how and why they are getting here.  I 
think it has to do sometimes with the culture of not wanting to be in Miami or feeling 
more comfortable in New Orleans in terms of architecture and things like that.  But 
they're recent immigrants who land here, young people in their 20's or 30's.  And I didn't 
even know they were here until the other day when I was at a party or something -- 
because we have two young Cuban students -- and said, oh, she's Cuban; oh, he's Cuban.  
They just arrived 10 years ago.  They just arrived a couple of months ago.  And I thought, 
really?  
 
KG:  Right. 
  
 89 
D:  Okay.  So that may change a lot in terms of -- that might impact how the community 
is viewed.  For many years this was viewed as a very conservative community.  And you 
know, my friends that -- the guys that I'm working on this society with are an exception 
to the rule rather than the norm.  The norm was to be intransigent.  So these recent 
immigrants have changed the face of Miami; have changed the political face of Miami 
because they are not political exiles.  They can go back and forth now and they want to 
go back and forth.  They want to come here like any other -- like from any other country 
in Latin America. 
 
KG:  Yeah, just like anybody. 
 
D:  They want to come here and make money and send it home and go back home.  Go 
back to port, live here, go see mama.  And they're doing that.  I mean…it amazes me how 
many moms and dads I see on this plane bringing their children home for the summer 
because it is cheaper for them to stay with grandma than to put them in childcare.   
 
KG:  Yeah.  I guess it kind of makes sense.   
 
D:  Yeah.  So it's become a normal route. 
 
KG:  Yeah. 
 
D:  A normal immigrant experience, which is now exacerbated of course by the belief in 
Cuba that the dry-foot, wet-foot policy is going to end soon.  I have to agree with them.  
It's a policy that doesn't make any sense.  I don't know if Obama has the political capital 
left to do it.  But it's the only immigrant group that is privileged like that.  Within three 
months of being here, you can get a work permit and within a year you'll have your green 
card.  
 
KG:  Yeah. 
 
D:  They're going to open up trade with Cuba, try to get rid of embargo.  That's got to go 
because that just sets up an untenable situation.  It's politically very unstable to have all 
these people going through Central America, going through Mexico. 
 
The idea that these Cubans preferred to travel back and forth between the US and Cuba was so 
uncommon that it was disrupting the past narrative on US-Cuba relations. Subject D’s statement 
that the regularity of their travel is normalizing the route suggests this symbolic gesture is 
contributing to the viability of political alternatives. If as she says US-Cuba travel becomes a, 
“normal route” then the embargo appears even less effective and even more irrational. These 
individual actions have resulted in increasingly relaxed travel restrictions since 2014. 
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American businessperson. The last type of individual policy entrepreneur is the American 
businessperson who sought to politically empower the Cuban people through increased trade 
relations. They were some of the first people to investigate the legal terms of the embargo policy 
as to what was permissible for travel and trade. In one case, a small business owner from 
Alabama remembered her active role in facilitating trade with Cuba after the passage of TSRA, 
G: …I realized that I understood at that point that there was trade that was legal, that U.S. 
companies could sell agricultural products, medical products, and anything that had to do 
with travel was legal to do business in Cuba, but it had to be for cash.  Cubans had to pay 
in cash.  And they could not sell anything back to us.  
 
KG:  Uh-huh. 
 
G:  So I spent a lot of time learning about all of this.  I mean, it kind of just rolls off my 
tongue now like I always knew this, but it was hard to learn because there was very little 
information.  And mostly the only information was getting on the U.S. government 
website and learning what you couldn't do with Cuba.  So in reading through all of the, 
you know, the minutia of government documents.  I'm not an attorney and, you know, it 
was difficult -- but I did learn.  I also had a very good relationship with my 
congressman… Also my senators () were very helpful in helping me get licensing to be 
able to go to Cuba.  But of course at the beginning, the only thing we could do was to go 
and [for] arts or learning or education.  But at the same time, I was learning how to trade 
with Cuba and I did meet with different people in Washington, again, to make sure that I 
-- I didn't want to step on anybody's toes and I certainly didn't want to get myself arrested 
for anything. 
 
KG:  Exactly.   
 
G:  So I was learning all of this.  And actually, about two years later while I'm still under 
the learning curve, my husband [?] one day he said, you know, I think it's great that 
you've gotten interested in all of this.  You've learned all of this, but you know, you don't 
need to spend any more money on it.  You need to make money on this.  So you know, 
what do you think you can do?  We're in the restaurant business to start with so I thought, 
you know, [he] brought up, something I know about, I have really good relationships 
with large hospitality industry's food resources so that's where I began… 
 
KG:  Oh, yeah. 
 
G:  And so I sat down with the president of () in Alabama and asked him, you know, do 
you think () would like to sell to Cuba?  Well he did a little back checking.  And anyway, 
fast forward, I ended up taking the () representatives for several, I guess, on two or three 
years to Cuba.  And we were able to open trade…Right at the beginning after I first went 
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to Cuba, I realized that there was no company that was doing business in Cuba from 
Alabama. 
 
KG:  Really? 
 
G:  And I really wanted to open trade up for my state.  That was the first thing I did.  And 
I was able to put together a group of -- my congressman… And we put together a guest 
list of who did we want to take… 
 
KG:  Wow. 
 
G:  …Anyway, basically it was about 10 dignitaries.  And we took two private jets and 
we got flyover permission.  I did all of this in Washington to get all of these things that 
we could do.  And we took two small private jets and flew directly from Mobile to 
Havana, the first direct flight in, at that time, like 43 years.   
 
KG:  Wow.  
 
G:  And again, a lot of this was because Cuba -- Havana and Mobile as the same thing for 
Havana and New Orleans had a long history of trade.  And there's a lot of families in 
Mobile that still have roots in Cuba.  Their grandparents have homes there or great 
grandparents.  Some of them honeymooned there back, you know, before 1960.  So that 
was a huge opportunity for me to open up trade.  And while we were there, the head at 
that time of the Alimports -- do you know what Alimport is?   
 
KG:  That was the tourism company down there? 
 
G:  Yeah.  It's the company that purchases all the food for Cuba and then distributes it to 
their own state-owned companies that then supply restaurants and hotels and grocery 
stores.  So the head of Alimport was a man named () at that time.  And () was extremely 
helpful and very anxious to do business in Alabama.  So we were able that first trip to -- I 
was able to set up meetings for our dignitaries to meet with Mr. ().  And they promised a 
$20 million dollar deal with Alabama businesses.  That was huge.  
 
KG:  Wow. 
 
G:  We actually had a press conference in Havana.  We called the papers in Alabama and 
that's what first opened trade or businesses in Alabama.  Right after that, our newly 
elected agricultural commissioner also got involved and he really carried the ball on this 
for a long time and took a lot of trade missions there from business people from around 
the state…Then right after that is when I got more involved …we actually several times 
did big food shows in Cuba where their state-run companies can purchase from ().  So, 
you know, that went on for a couple of years…But in the meantime, I was still meeting 
with people in Washington and working on trade.  My reason for doing that which I 
really haven't said, is I felt like the way to get rid of the embargo, which I have always 
felt -- not always of course, but in the last 10 or 15 years -- I lived in South Florida for a 
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long time…And I've met a lot of wonderful Cuban people that had come at the time of 
the revolution.  They were the most charming, lovely people that I had ever known…   
 
KG:  Right.  
 
G:  These were people that fled the island, mostly came with nothing.  And at the time I 
knew them most of them were in their 60's and 70's I would say.  And I was so impressed 
to know what fabulous people came from Cuba.  So my feelings after living in South 
Florida about the embargo, I was very ambivalent about it and I felt like trade might be 
the way to help the Cuban people take the situation in their own hands.  And if they saw 
that there were opportunities, then they in their own way would overcome the 
communistic regime there.  I mean, I was not a rabble-rouser in any means, but I just felt 
like the trade might be the right way to have that happen.  So I went to Cuba probably, I 
don't know, at least 25 times over that four or five year period. 
 
KG:  Wow. 
 
G:  And at the end of that time, in a lot of ways I became very discouraged.  I realized 
that a lot of the large companies -- you know, I was pretty idealistic when I started on 
this.  I was thinking that American -- large American companies that would trade in 
Cuba, that they had the same idea that I did; that it was going to help the Cuban people 
get their life back, get their courage back.  And toward the end of that…I realized that … 
the huge, huge U.S. companies that were doing business in Cuba, they really didn't want -
- or I felt like.  I shouldn't say because I don't know what they wanted.  But I felt like they 
looked very happy with the status quo.  They didn't necessarily want the Cuban people to 
be under a free-trade regime.  They were very happy that they had a corner on the market 
for soy bean oil or corn or pork or chicken.   You know, these were the large -- …very 
large companies. 
 
KG:  Uh-huh. 
 
G:  They didn't necessarily want things to change because, as I said, they had their little 
niche and they were making money on it.  And it was cash money, you know.  It was not 
on credit.  So about that time, I really just felt like, you know, I had done what I started 
out to do and that was open trade for the state of Alabama.  By the time I stopped going 
down and working on those, Cuba had become the ninth largest trading partner for the 
state of Alabama.  We were selling not only chickens and soy beans, but timber telephone 
poles and all kinds of things and in the hundreds of millions of dollars.  So that is kind of 
my story. 
 
KG:  Wow.  No, that's so amazing because just trying to find -- you're exactly who I've 
been trying to find; people who have been active in kind of moving trade along.  But 
that's a fascinating story.   
 
G:  Yeah, there was fabulous, wonderful, interesting moments.  I mean, it wasn't all, you 
know, just idealism on my part.  But I did make something happen. 
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From this narrative a clear distinction in intentions emerges between small American business 
owners and large American corporations. Politically, subject G began her trade missions with the 
intention of helping the Cuban people gain increased independence from government control, but 
in building trade those relationships she realized that her corporate partners were more interested 
opening a new consumer market. The political and economic freedoms of the Cuban people did 
not matter; in fact she felt that they preferred the status quo, which afforded them preferential 
market access. Both small American businesspeople and large corporations used their economic 
relationships to expand trade with Cuba but as policy entrepreneurs, the former acted in support 
of policy change based on experiences with individuals while the latter operated at a higher level 
of rationale, the state level. 
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Policy Entrepreneurs at the State Level 
 
 
The end of Bill Clinton’s second term as President of the US marked the beginning of a 
shift in US–Cuba relations under the auspices of humanitarian aide. Just five years removed from 
the restrictive Helms Burton Act and one year removed from TSRA that allowed US exports of 
agricultural, medicine, and medical products to Cuba, Hurricane Michelle ripped through the 
island nation brining heavy rains, severe flooding and destroying approximately ten thousand 
homes (Cubahurricanes.org, n.d.). Alvarez (2004) argues that the severity of damage particularly 
to agricultural areas pushed the Cuban government to purchase food and agricultural products 
from US firms. This initial action was a precursor to additional imports of American agricultural 
goods as Cuba went from the US’ 226th most important agricultural export market to 35th in three 
years time.  
 
Figure 14 Chart of total Cuban agriculture imports from 2005 to 2014, where colored lines 
represent market share; red represents the US, green represents the European Union, violet 
represents Brazil, orange represents Argentina, and blue represents Canada (USDA, 2015, p. 3) 
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Throughout the rest of the decade the US maintained a significant share of the Cuban agriculture 
imports market, but recent years have seen this position drop from 42 percent in 2009 to 16 
percent in 2014 (see Figure 14) (USDA, 2015). Despite the recent decline, agriculture was a 
pioneering industry in early trade with Cuba post-TSRA. 
The impact of TSRA in expanding the realm of political and economic possibilities for 
state level actors was clear as states began to explore trade opportunities with Cuba. Trade 
delegations traveling to the island increased significantly, typically comprised of representatives 
from US state governments, business interests, and trade associations like the USA Rice 
Federation. One participant describes the intentions of delegation members at that time, 
KG: Were there many delegations traveling to Cuba in 2000s? 
 
W: …oh yeah there was a lot of activity. You had states, especially Midwestern 
agricultural states were down there with huge delegations from the department of 
agriculture and people who…they basically promoted the idea of doing business with 
Cuba and they wanted to expand it. Because its all based on humanitarian aid right now 
and certainly agricultural products fall into that category but giving how goods had to be 
purchased it was so difficult to do business. Cuba had to pay cash in advance for any 
products that really limited their ability to sell goods down there. So they went down 
there with big delegation hoping to convince them, federal legislators, their US senators 
and Congressmen that it was time for a change. 
 
He highlights the active role that agricultural interests from the US played in outreach to Cuba 
but also touches on the extent of market manipulation US sanctions imposed. The US embargo 
required Cuba to pay in cash for any imports from US firms. This made it more difficult for them 
acquire enough capital to make significant purchases, but it also made them a more attractive 
trading partner for US states compared to other countries purchasing with credit. Given these 
restrictions, states continued to reach out and once they recognized the opportunity they returned 
to the US and became the chief advocates for policy change at the federal level (i.e. end of the 
embargo). Gone was the Cold War rhetoric of the twentieth century, the new narrative was that 
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states were losing out economically to the rest of the world and the main impediment to 
regaining that competitive edge was the federal government. 
States’ Rights, Symbolic Gestures and the Limits of Trade Advocacy 
The interplay of governing powers between the US federal government and state 
governments is collectively known as the concept of federalism. This tension of powers is 
fundamental to American politics and traces back to the founding of America and the ratification 
of the US Constitution. Those advocates of greater state powers organize under the notion of 
states’ rights, and they focus on the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution and its delegation of 
powers, not expressly given to the federal government, to the states or to the people. Study 
participants involved at the state level of authority framed the debate over the US embargo in 
similar terms of federal overreach. Subject A, a senior level executive within the freight 
transportation industry of Louisiana, explains the supremacy of federal power in determining 
trade policy and the influence of politics on that process, 
If you look at where the sanctions are, the sanctions are a result of the federal 
government.  In order for there to be change in trade patterns with Cuba, it has to be 
fostered by the federal government.  It has to be fostered by, preferably, both the 
president of the United States and the congress.  Congress is starting to warm up to the 
idea, but the president has to be the leader on this.  And states are totally secondary on 
this.  The president of the United States is the agent of change on this, it seems to me 
anyway.  And everything a president does is political. 
 
This statement leaves little room for states’ agency in the removal of trade sanctions recognizing 
the power that the President holds in advocating for change. He begins by acknowledging the 
role of the federal government in creating the current economic situation with Cuba and that it’s 
their responsibility to fix it. And while it’s true the embargo is comprised of both executive and 
legislative restrictions, states in conjunction with representatives from the Cuban government 
began to build economic and political relationships as early as 2001 that would form the basis of 
future policy advocacy networks. The following narrative explicitly describes the development 
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of this relationship and the deliberate actions of policy entrepreneurs in the US and Cuba to 
couple the problem and policies streams while simultaneously focusing attention on the politics 
stream,  
There was a guy part of the Cuban government, came up as an architect for one of the 
really brilliant things they’ve done with regards to US trade, which I think was the 
forerunner of what’s happening right now under the Obama administration with the 
strengthening of trade, to the extent that the President can do that. And also because of a 
bill that was passed in Congress just a few years ago.  
 
But this one guy comes up with the idea of [I want to say they spent 80 million but I’m 
not really sure what the cost was, I’m going to be wrong on the number]. The Cuban 
government set aside some money and they sent representatives to the US and they 
invited, they opened dialogue with states, individual states not with the federal 
government. And so for example they invited Louisiana to come to Cuba and talk about 
trade. So Governor Blanco goes down with a bunch of rice farmers and they sell a bunch 
of rice to Cuba. And Georgia sells a bunch of chicken parts, and Arkansas sells rice, and I 
actually had a count at one time of 38 different states had sent trade missions to Cuba in 
support and Cuba had actually bought stuff from them. 
 
Now the US rule, that’s still in place right now, that says when Cuba buys anything from 
the US they have to pay in cash, that’s a way to make it harder to trade, nothing’s done 
with credit. And they’ve also had bad experiences in the past where Cuba has gone and 
nationalized companies and revolution and so forth. So Cuba had to pay cash for that 
rice. Now they’re getting shiploads of rice from Vietnam in Cuba but they’re buying on 
credit. And at that time that I started looking at this Cuba’s debt was 17 billion dollars or 
something like that. So they owe 17 billion dollars to other countries around the world 
but they’re paying cash to the US. And the reason they were doing that was to build a 
market, cause now you’re talking any rice farmer in Louisiana, if you mention Cuba they 
will remind you that Cuba was their biggest trade partner years ago. The port of New 
Orleans would ship a whole bunch of rice to Cuba and they’d love to do business, they’d 
like to sell to Cuba again. 
 
So that’s what Cuba did, they created that big demand in the US, where all these different 
businesses in the US saying that ‘I want to business with Cuba, I want to do business with 
Cuba’. And that’s how it happened, a strategic economic initiative on the part of the 
Cuban government suddenly, more people in the US now want to have relations with 
Cuba then don’t, and that didn’t happen years ago. It happened as a direct result of some 
very very () Cubans, and it opened things up.  
 
And those people went back to their states saying we need to change the laws in the US, 
we need to be able to sell on credit…we need to be able to sell stuff beyond food and 
medical supplies. (Subject F) 
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From his point of view, the Cuban government was the main driving force behind establishing 
economic ties with US states. Similar comments from Subject E supported the Cuban 
government’s active role, 
Well the Cubans were looking for any vehicle to -- they call it the blockade.  They were 
looking for any way that they could get the blockade lifted.  And they thought that 
building favor with the American public, the American business community, or 
whomever would lead to the lifting of the blockade as they call it.  And so this many 
years later, here we are with a president who is seeking to cause to thaw and then he is 
actually seeking for or will be seeking for congress to lift that embargo.   
 
Although the Cuban government publicly condemns the embargo, as evidenced by the multitude 
of public displays denouncing “the blockade”, by reaching out to states first they were able to 
successfully turn American policy entrepreneur’s cautious optimism into united promotion for 
change. This strategy came at the price of paying cash with American firms while running 
significant debts with other trading partners around the world. The gamble appeared to produce 
positive results as both countries have worked to normalize relations over the last two years. The 
strength of this US state-Cuban government alliance since 2001 partially explains the opening of 
the current policy window in 2014. Another participant casts some doubt as to which side took 
the initial step post-TSRA, 
KG: who reached out first? 
 
W: it’s hard to say but to be honest I think it was really more of a push from the US side, 
I think the US side looked at it from two perspectives: 1. The embargo really has not 
accomplished what it was designed to accomplish, which was to bring down Castro, first 
and foremost is just didn’t do that. And secondly I think a lot of people look at it from the 
perspective of here’s a country of 11 million people that should be a viable business 
partner with the US that we’re losing out on entirely, simply because of this embargo and 
this failed strategy of trying to oust Castro. (Subject W) 
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His view that the embargo has failed was shared among many participants. He believed that the 
US acted first in trying to repair the relationship but only out of obligation to uphold its 
ideological commitment to free trade.  
Participants described the US’ reputation worldwide as positive but they also expressed a 
sentiment that the US is losing out on a major economic opportunity. The embargo was 
unreasonable, considering existing US trade relationships with other countries that it has 
conflicting political ideologies with like China and Vietnam. As their economies continue to 
liberalize and increase trade with the US, that tension has diminished somewhat but America’s 
continued rigid stance towards Cuba appears even less reasonable in the context of these other 
trade relationships. The public criticism from policy entrepreneurs lacks a definite problem 
because potential trade with Cuba represents a very small share of total US trade. Their line of 
thinking is based on the lack of rationale with the embargo. Zahariadis (2014) suggests that the 
search for rationale without a distinct problem signifies that a policy window has opened within 
the politics stream and that the resulting process is ideological (p. 37). In such cases the need to 
pursue policy solutions supersedes the existence of a clear problem to solve. But institutional 
organization at the state level limits policy entrepreneur’s advocacy efforts. 
The quasi-public nature of freight transportation in the US complicates the advocacy 
process for state level policy entrepreneurs. Unlike Cuba where the government owns the means 
of production, in the US different sections of the commodity supply chain fall under either 
private, municipal, state, or federal jurisdiction creating a complex network of bureaucracy to 
navigate when moving goods domestically and internationally. One seaport representative 
classified their entity as,  
The attorney’s tell me that the appropriate term is, “we are an independent political 
subdivision of the state of Louisiana. Which means we were created by the state but we 
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receive no money for our operating revenues, so we have to generate our own operating 
revenues. We have in the past received some money for capital equipment and capital 
projects but from an operating standpoint, our salaries our expenses, whether it be 
electricity, water or all those kind of things are generated by the fees we charge users of 
the port. (Subject W) 
 
Other participants stressed the importance of the relationship between ports and rail operations in 
multi-modal freight transportation. American railroads operate under a different classification 
espoused by a participant from the railroad industry as,  
…we’re an unattached board of the city and a political subdivision of the state. So () 
report to a nine member commission, which there is the president pro-tem…, there’s four 
different committees within that commission and then the mayor is the president of the 
commission. (Subject H) 
 
So politically, this railroad is a state entity but they are a part of the city bureaucracy and must 
report to a board of commissioners of which the city’s mayor is the president. As public entities 
that ensure the movement of private goods on typically public infrastructure, ports and railroads 
are limited in their ability to advocate for policy change nationally. Respondents expressed a 
good working relationship with their federal counterparts in daily operations including US Coast 
Guard, Customs and Border Protection, USDA, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Surface 
Transportation Board, Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). Any official 
lobbying efforts could only occur through association with special interest groups active in 
Washington DC. In an industry that is dedicated to trade promotion, the embargo has revealed 
the extent of power public agents have at the state level, 
[We’re for free trade] but we certainly recognize that there are instances where politics 
has to and sometimes will dominate, so we’ll promote trade with Cuba to the extent that 
we can right now. So what’s legal we certainly try to take advantage of but as far as 
changing policy we don’t get that actively involved in measures to affect policy because 
as a quasi-state government agency its really not our role to do that and I think our board 
in the past has been very cautious about making sure that we don’t try to push something 
that could have political backlashes for us. And to be honest, this is one that over the 
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years has really waned. I don’t think that too many people see a huge backlash coming, 
but I don’t think they see a clearly defined role for us in the process. Its really something 
that needs to be pushed at the federal level than at the state level. And to the extent that 
we’ve show support by going to Cuba and coming back and saying, ‘hey we think there 
are opportunities for Louisiana businesses’ that’s really about all we can do. (Subject W) 
 
Policy entrepreneur’s solution to the policy distortion of the embargo was to push the 
limits of federal laws to their maximum using symbolic gestures in lieu of outright lobbying. 
Trade delegations from the US, which included state politicians, alleviated political antagonisms 
between the two nations. Economically there is no better way to communicate confidence in 
trading with Cuba, then by actually establishing export agreements. And that is exactly what 
these state policy entrepreneurs did. Though the federal government set the political and legal 
boundaries of engagement with Cuba, the agency of state level actors symbolized their openness 
to normal relations. This symbolism included their trade visits and export deals as well as their 
ability to communicate the magnitude of economic irrationality. 
States’ Role in Agriculture and Tourism 
Many study participants identified agriculture and tourism as the two industries that stand 
to gain the most from trade normalization with Cuba and it is no coincidence that these are two 
areas where states and their respective policy entrepreneurs have considerable influence. 
Globally, America’s trade partners see the US as a major food supplier as one respondent 
described it, “we still have a disproportionate agrarian state in the world economy (Subject A). 
Another respondent in the US freight forwarding industry discussed the agricultural potential of 
the US, 
I mean the important thing too is that we could be one of the breadbaskets of the world.  
We've got the Great Plains, grain, whatever.  I mean, you've got five major areas of the 
world.  You've got the U.S., Canada, Australia, Argentina, the Ukraine.  Those are the 
broad, wide areas that can grow the kinds of grain crops that we'll need to feed a growing 
world population.  And food security might be very important.  I'm not saying that's 
going to be used as a tool to get certain trade concessions, but certainly food security in 
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the coming years is going to be a big player I think.  And at least we have the advantage 
of the ability to use these resources to our benefit. 
 
And as populations increase, as middle-class is increased -- you can see it in India right 
now too -- if there is middle-class increasing, they want more protein in their diet.  And 
you get protein from chickens or pork….So they want more protein in their diets.  And 
we're protein producers too.  So there's something to say to that. (Subject C) 
 
Beyond Cuba, he believed America had the capacity to feed other developing nations around the 
world. Agriculture is a defining characteristic of America’s economic reputation. Interview 
participants consistently mentioned food and agriculture products as key to the US-Cuba 
relationship, specifically rice, soybeans, and frozen meats. Figure 15 shows two snapshots of the 
composition of US agricultural exports to Cuba in 2005 and 2014. In 2005 the US exported a 
wider variety of agricultural goods, with poultry meat & products, wheat, corn, and rice as the 
top commodities. More recently in 2014, poultry meat & products and soybean products 
dominated US agricultural exports to Cuba, comprising almost 75 percent of the total. These 
2014 export figures support participant’s conflicting sentiments of economic loss and market 
opportunity for the agriculture industry. Similar mixed feelings were shared about the fate of 
tourism in US-Cuba relations. 
 
Figure 15 Composition of US agricultural exports to Cuba by commodity type in 2005 and 2014 
(USDA, 2015). 
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The US embargo of Cuba and its limiting travel bans has negatively impacted the 
American tourism industry. With the rise of service-oriented economies over the last fifty years, 
states now compete domestically and abroad for increasingly fickle tourist dollars. The 
promotion of tourism is one issue where cities, states, and the federal government have common 
interests. One participant with many years of experience working in the New Orleans freight 
transportation sector described the interplay between city, state, and federal roles in tourism and 
trade promotion,  
The industry leader in terms of assistance to nations abroad would certainly be the federal 
government.  Our federal government does far more than any state government does.  
What state governments tend to do, if you look at the model of what we have in the state 
of Louisiana, the lieutenant governor of our state is the chief agent of tourism.  He tries or 
she tries to bring tourists to Louisiana.  And you will find more push from them on the 
cultural side to get people to come to Louisiana.  Conversely, their involved in getting 
people to visit other countries as well.  There's reciprocal agreements in terms of cultural 
stuff whether it's the music, food, tourism, et cetera.  And tourism is largely handled or 
even completely handled by states whereas the money -- the science of giving money and 
giving subsidy to foreign governments comes from the federal government.  In the 
meantime, the city, despite whatever the mayor says, the city does virtually nothing.  And 
the reason is the city doesn't have any money. (Subject A) 
 
He then shifts the conversation from governments to ports and their role, 
…a lot of people don't realize the Port of () is not a regional port.  It's a state port. It’s a 
state agency. And it does not focus on tourism except that the Port of () is sort of caught 
in the trap that it does a million cruise ship passengers a year.  So it does want cruise 
ships.  It is actively promoting tourism.  And what they want is just the opposite of what 
the state wants.  Excuse me, I'm saying that wrong.  It's the same thing.  They want 
people to come in on ships and come visit.  They want people to park their car in the 
parking lot because they make a lot of money on the cruise ship parking lot.  So there is a 
push to have reciprocal trade agreements in place. (Subject A) 
 
In the end of this statement, Subject A reiterates the federal influence in tourism by building 
relationships through trade agreements. So not only do trade agreements facilitate international 
goods movement, they are instrumental in promoting tourism. In the case of US-Cuba relations 
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over the last fifteen years, it was the federal government that set the trade boundaries and it was 
policy entrepreneurs at state level that became the agents for change within them. 
States’ Agency within Federal Structures 
State policy entrepreneurs have increased amounts of power and access to federal 
bureaucrats in comparison to individuals. Zahariadis (2014) asserted that the effectiveness of 
policy entrepreneurs is largely dependent on the extent of their resources and access (p. 40). On 
the US side, policy entrepreneurs used their power and access to test the limits of political 
boundaries set by the federal government in US-Cuba relations. On the surface these actions 
were gestures of good will meant to build political support but for these policy entrepreneurs 
they saw it as accomplishing their job duties to grow trade. The fluid nature of supply chains 
towards the path of least expense injects an element of uncertainty into competition among states 
for additional freight traffic. For example one representative from the freight rail industry 
described their actions to remain competitive, 
We don’t necessarily set trade policy right, but what we do do is we set our tariff rates, 
that allows competition and allows the port to be able to compete with the other ports… 
So by setting tariffs that allow us to be able to move commodities cheaper allows for that 
competition, allows to get that commodity here that we didn’t have before. So again, 
we’re not necessarily get involved in real policy development for trade because that’s not 
our function but we can influence trade by tariffs setting, price setting. (Subject H) 
 
State policy entrepreneurs, accustomed to operating under conditions of constant domestic and 
international competition were the ideal surrogates for Cuban efforts to end the embargo. Cuba 
represented a new opportunity for trade and it was the federal government that was denying that 
right, “the Cubans continued to want to buy from the U.S. to get favorable relations established, 
but process was made difficult by the American government, by our own government.” (Subject 
E). So their solution was to work within the current laws to show that renewed trade relations 
could benefit state economies and foster economic reform in Cuba.  
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Policy Entrepreneurs at the National Level 
 
 
National level policy entrepreneurs are those individuals who hold some national or 
international position of influence over a large number of people. Their authority is expressed 
through the exercise of governing powers, control of the public debate on specific policy issues, 
and use of symbolic gestures. This elevated status within the public media allows their message 
to reach a wider audience including other policymakers. In many ways national policy 
entrepreneurs are themselves political symbols of a nation’s identity (Tsygankov, 2000). 
Throughout the embargo, the US has elected 11 different presidents while Cuba has had just two, 
Fidel and now Raúl Castro. Since adoption of the Bretton Woods Agreement, national policy 
entrepreneurs have worked to make free market principles a core element of the American 
identity. The results of which have allowed policymakers to set the terms of international trade 
via trade agreements as described by one participant, 
I think for some reason, a lot of other countries think that, you know, the U.S. is the big 
bully to some extent.  It's going to be my way or the highway.  But essentially, free of 
trade has benefitted the U.S. looking at just some of these current trade agreements they 
have right now.  The DR-CAFTA, we used to be running at a 1.8 billion dollar deficit 
annually.  Now that's completely turned around to not a deficit. 
 
These kinds of trade agreements would eliminate the duplicity in government inspection, 
reduce the overall cost of the items, and should make the process move smoother. 
(Subject C) 
 
The boundaries between MSA streams are fluid for national policy entrepreneurs as they set 
agendas, focus attention through the use of symbols, and advocate for policy solutions. During 
times of political ambiguity, policy solutions have a greater chance for adoption (Zahariadis, 
2014, p. 37). Policy entrepreneurs at the national level act at the most advantageous moment 
inside the politics stream to maximize media exposure of an issue and to generate public support 
for further action. Roberts and King (1991) maintain that their goal is to influence events rather 
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than control them. In moving towards a reduction in economic sanctions against Cuba, national 
policy entrepreneurs like President Barack Obama and President Raúl Castro coupled all three 
MSA streams to create a policy window in 2014 that remains open to this day. 
Creating and Extending Policy Windows 
The passage of the TSRA in 2000 marked the discreet opening of a policy window in US-
Cuba relations. It was discreet in the minimal national media coverage and the general lack of 
understanding from the American public as to what was then permissible in travel and trade. One 
participant with experience in public and private economic development described the political 
intentions of TSRA and its connection to the Obama administration, 
Obama recognized that Cuba being 90 miles from our borders, being the largest island in 
the Antilles with a significant population approaching 12 million, that that market would 
be a substantial one close enough to the United States to capitalize and they needed 
everything.  But the issue was always do they have funds to be able to buy things.  
Certainly since the downturn of the Soviet Union and its role in Cuba, the United States 
politically saw that as an opportunity to make inroads in light of the existing embargo 
which is why the TSRA Act was authorized.  So the answer, yes, it was a move to access 
a market that the U.S. was unable to access before.  And all of those things -- there's so 
many things from humanitarian to academic, even religious interests were not thwarted.  
They were actually allowed by the U.S. and the Cubans to occur.  And that was all a 
matter of gaining a favorable status relationship so that in the end Cuba would normalize 
relations with the United States.  And I think the United States because of the TSRA Act 
was looking forward to that as a step towards lifting the embargo, normalizing relations, 
offsetting any influence by another socialist or communist government. (Subject E)  
 
He identified the Cuban government as a willing participant in increasing American visits to 
Cuba for non-tourist purposes. But he also highlighted the timing of the legislation as Cuba was 
recovering from severe recession of the early 1990s triggered by the loss of Soviet subsidies. 
Following the Cuban special period of economic reform, 2000 represented an opportunity for the 
US to tip the balance of the ideological scales towards free market capitalism. This action was a 
precursor to the renewed effort to normalize relations 14 years later. 
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On December 17th, 2014 Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro called coinciding 
press conferences to announce that both countries were committing to renew diplomatic 
relations. Castro’s speech did not promise significant changes in Cuba but it did communicate a 
willingness to discuss issues of national sovereignty, democracy, human rights, and foreign 
policy. He also acknowledged the contribution of Pope Francis and the Canadian government, 
adding further weight to the importance of the announcement. Study participants in the US and 
Cuba confirmed the significance of these speeches in, as Subject Q called it, “expanding the 
political space” to discuss US-Cuba relations in a positive manner. The symbolism of dual press 
conferences signified an atmosphere of we’re in this together but that any reforms would be on 
the Cuban government’s terms. Subject Q, a Cuban academic, articulated the Cuban position on 
trade relations with the US in a sociohistorical context. The revolution of 1959 happened for a 
reason, as American ownership of Cuban assets reached levels that threatened their national 
sovereignty. Any normalization efforts would need to first and foremost, preserve Cuba’s 
independence. 
When asked to recall the earliest memory of this current normalization process, all 
respondents identified these coordinated announcements in 2014 as the beginning, supporting its 
status as the opening of a policy window. Since then both nations have lifted many barriers to 
normal relations like the removal of Cuba from the list of national sponsors of terrorism, the re-
opening of embassies, a relaxing of travel restrictions, Cuban repatriation reform, and some 
financial reforms. President Obama’s visit to Cuba in March 2016 will serve as another symbolic 
gesture of good faith to the promises of 2014 and it will extend the viability of the policy 
window in pursuit of the end of the embargo. 
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Expanding Political Space 
Once a policy window is open, national policy entrepreneurs work to define the 
parameters of the public debate. For US presidents this power is often referred to as the bully 
pulpit and they typically exercise it in the problems and politics stream to draw attention to a 
problem or to build political support for a specific position. In the case of President Obama’s 
visit to Cuba, his national security advisor Ben Rhodes said it best, “We believe that by opening 
up space we can help empower the Cuban people to live better lives.” (Roberts, 2016) He 
explicitly indicates their intentions to expand political space for average Cubans to advocate for 
greater control of their respective fates, i.e. democracy. So politically and symbolically, a 
physical presence was believed to be the best way to start the reform process and that view is still 
used to support normalization efforts. The normalization process will also require economic 
action as years of embargo have distorted the Cuban economy to the detriment of the Cuban 
people while strengthening the Cuban government’s role as an economic intermediary. 
Financial Manipulation and Market Distortion 
In addition to opening policy windows, national policy entrepreneurs exert their 
governing influence to manipulate economies in support of their political ideals. As one Cuban-
American businessman explained it, the Cuban government has used the US embargo as a 
scapegoat to deflect blame for their failed economic policies (Subject R). An end of the embargo 
would make it difficult for the Cuban government to paint America as the bad guy politically and 
economically. In the meantime the embargo endures, as does the Cuban government’s 
domineering role in the economy. Their ownership of the means of production, land, and 
infrastructure means most Cubans are employees of the state. One American businessman 
described the financial scenario in the early 2000s,  
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Anytime you dealt with Cuba, you were dealing with the government officials no matter 
what the company is called.  They may have had a company they claimed was a 
company, but it was always a government agency. 
 
So not only were you precluded by the embargo from visiting, you were precluded from 
shipping there, you were precluded from actually spending money in Cuba -- spending 
U.S. currency in Cuba.  So you had to make a special arrangement, again, through the 
Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control to be able to pre-pay -- when 
we visited, we had to pre-pay everything from transportation to hotel. 
 
…The actual sale of product was further convoluted because you had to use a third-party 
bank.  There was no banking relationship because, again, the embargo precluded that.  So 
for instance, you had to go through a bank in France or a bank in Mexico or something 
like that when you sold product so that they could pay you which added the cost to the 
Cubans. (Subject E) 
 
The embargo severely distorted financial operations between the US and Cuba. This was one 
area where the Cuban government felt the impact of sanctions; the added costs of trade with US 
firms. Not to be outdone, the Cuban government’s intermediary role in the economy distorted 
foreign direct investment agreements in Cuba, 
…all of those hotels were invested by people from Canada, Spain, Venezuela, Mexico, 
Ireland, the UK, et cetera.  And the relationship was -- and I interviewed one of the Irish 
managers about how did it work.  And he said, well you're given a concession by the 
government.  And in that concession you have the land which you don't own but you 
have the lease of the land for long term so that you get your return investment.  And you 
are then allowed to build for a purpose and that purpose would be to build a hotel/resort 
type development.  And you are given a number of people.  He said traditionally they ask 
you how many people do you need for construction.  You give them a number and they'll 
give you -- if you say, I need 100; they'll say, here's 200.  And you have to provide the 
well-being for hospitals for healthcare, to schools, to cafeterias, you name it.  But you 
only pay them like $30 a month. 
 
So when you finish with that construction, the construction materials and construction 
equipment is then turned over to the Cuban government because you had to bring it on 
the island because it didn't exist.  And then you go into operations.  And they will ask you 
how many people do you need to operate.  And if you tell them I need 150 people to 
operate it, they give you 300.  But again, you have to provide all the housing, all the 
healthcare, et cetera.  So it's a social welfare mechanism that the Cubans impose on the 
people coming in.  But the return on investment was five years which means that that's 
pretty significant.  So it turned into more of a blue-collar attraction because just think, 
you know, people have lots of choices.  They could go to high-end resorts nearby in 
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Mexico, Jamaica, the islands, whatever.  Because the Cuban products are good products 
but they weren't high-end products and they were less expensive. (Subject E) 
 
Cuban’s salaries are paid in the lower value moneda nacional currency or CUP that is 
only accepted within Cuba. The government also circulates the convertible peso or CUC meant 
for international exchange originally valued at 1 to 1 with the US dollar. They impose a 10 
percent surcharge on conversion of dollars as a penalty for America’s continued embargo. The 
current conversion rate of CUP to CUC is approximately 25 to 1. All foreign tourist activity is 
supposed to be conducted in CUC. So the government accepts foreign currency and converts it to 
CUC but then pays salaries in CUP. By creating a separate currency market to compensate 
Cuban’s labor, the government is able to extract the majority of the currency’s value. Two 
economies exist in Cuba, one dealing in CUP and the other in CUC. With the recent economic 
reforms under Raúl Castro that have expanded entrepreneurial activities and tourism, Cubans 
have more opportunities to earn CUC. Foreign companies are willing to deal with Cuba’s 
economic bureaucracy because they can still achieve the desired return on investment. One 
participant described the financial contortion within the tourism sector, 
Okay.  So the deal is that if you work in the tourism industry for a foreign company, for 
an operator, let's say a hotel that's called the Mariel ().  Mariel () is a Spanish company 
that operates the hotel.  Cuba owns it.  They are just the operators.  So if you work for 
one of these companies, you will get a salary in Cuban normal pesos.  Moneda nacional is 
what they call it, MN.  So if you see a price that is very high in MN, it's the other one.   
 
But then they will get a monthly supplement in CUC.  But the ones that are best off are 
the ones that are working for these foreign operators, in a hotel for example, but also in 
the service sector of the hotel because then you have tips.   
 
Under the table, yeah.  So that's how people get access to CUC most frequently is by 
working in the foreign sector in tourist sector, particularly positions where you come into 
personal contact with the tourist.  And that's official, but you could also have all these 
unofficial activities that bring you in touch with the tourist.  For example, operating your 
car as a taxi illegally which is easily done, selling stuff to tourists in the street or the 
markets.  They try to legalize it through the markets when it's artisans or art, but there's 
people selling stuff everywhere…Prostitution of course.  
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Consequently, the tourism sector is the best way to raise your standard of living in Cuba, a fact 
that was confirmed by other participant’s economic observations. Expansion of the Cuban 
tourism sector has slowly increased average Cuban’s access to CUC and as more Americans visit 
the island, the concept of positive US-Cuba relations is normalized. That activity coincides with 
the Obama administration’s executive action to reduce travel restrictions. 
Leave the Politics to the Government 
In interviews with Cubans and Americans they expressed the feeling that US-Cuba 
relations were unusual, not normal, unique and that it was a result of national manipulation 
through government propaganda initiatives. One Cuban bookstore owner recalled being taught as 
a child to be wary of the Yankees that were sworn enemies of Cuba. But as an adult he openly 
questioned the notion that Americans were different from any other people in the world. On the 
wall of his shop he kept a picture of the 1930s Cuban national marching band posing on the lawn 
of the Whitehouse in Washington DC. He had many questions about the Whitehouse and was 
shocked to learn that they offered regular tours inside, seeing as average Cubans rarely ever see 
the inside of their national party buildings. National policy entrepreneurs were instrumental in 
spreading misinformation about opposing societies. The following anecdote of an American 
businessman’s experience at the US Interest Section in Cuba epitomizes the irrationality of the 
US-Cuba ideological rivalry under different political administrations,  
All of this stuff that I'm telling you about, the differences and things of the Clinton, 
things under Bush, and now we come to Obama.  Obama has opened up the U.S. embassy 
in Havana.  It's a seven-story [columned] glass building that used to be called the U.S. 
Interests Section.  It was actually built during Jimmy Carter's era.  So on my first trip to 
Cuba on my first night in Cuba I lost my passport. 
 
And I went, okay, now what do I do?  So I went to the manager of the hotel I was staying 
in, Ambos Mundos and I said, I lost my passport.  I've looked everywhere.  I don't know 
what I did with it.  And I was staying in a room right next to the room where Ernest 
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Hemmingway wrote For Whom the Bell Tolls.  He was in room 512.  You know, I was in 
511 or something like that.   
 
It's a very historic place, really cool place, and tied to U.S. history.  And I said, you know 
-- so he says, what you need is you go to the police station, you file a report, and they'll 
stamp their report.  Then you take it to your embassy.  And I said, no, no.  You don't 
understand.  I'm not a Canadian.  I'm a United States citizen.  I said, do I go to the Swiss 
Embassy in that mansion out on 5th Avenue in Miramar.  He said, no, no.  You go to 
yours.  And I said, you don't understand.  I'm a United States citizen.  He comes and says, 
you don't understand, you have an embassy here.   
 
And so it turns out, I show up at this seven-story [columned] glass building.  There's a 
Cuban guard on each of the four corners.  It occupies an entire block.  And I explain to 
them why I'm there and I show them my little piece of paper and they say, okay.  Go in 
that first gate.  And there were a ton of people in the line at the second gate.  It went all 
the way to the end of the street, the end of the block, and then crossed over and half a 
block.  They were all waiting to go into this building, but I walked right up.  I'm the only 
person at my gate.  And a thing on the voice thing comes up next to a camera and says, 
can I help you?  And I said, yes.  Sir, are you a U.S. citizen?  I said yes.  So they came 
out and opened up the door.  They took me inside and they sat me in this room by myself.  
And I passed all these people who were at desks who were coming from that other line 
and they were all being interviewed or something.   
 
So I went into this conference room by myself and I sit there for a few minutes.  A guy 
came in, blue jeans, a plaid shirt, very obviously American.  And he says, can I help you?  
And I said, I lost my passport.  He said, what are you doing in Cuba?  And I said, I'm 
here with a licensed group.  I'll help you, he says, but it's going to cost you.  And I said, 
okay.  And he says, 45 bucks.  So I gave him my 45 dollars.  I came back -- oh, and he 
said I need two photo passport [charge] photos.  And I said, I stopped off at this little 
photo shop in old Havana, so he was like, alright.  I came back the next morning, I held 
up my hand, swore allegiance to the United States, and they handed me my passport.  
And for the next 10 years I had a U.S. passport that looks exactly like yours that inside it 
says, issued in Havana, Cuba.   
 
…And this is when we didn't have an embassy there because remember, this is during the 
Bush years.  So the U.S. Interest Section operated as the U.S. embassy just like the 
Cubans had a Cuban Interest Section in America.  The only difference is that, you know, 
we didn't have an ambassador there and we had -- we've got eight people there.   
 
So let me talk one other thing about Cuban/U.S. relations and how they relate to that 
particular building.  I watched something because I go to Cuba two or three times a year.  
I watched something unfurl during my visits because I was very fascinated by that tall 
building sitting there near the Hotel Nacional on the Malecon which is the seawall in 
Havana.  Because I knew that -- what I found out was our government was spending 
$38,000 a month housing U.S. federal employees in a facility in Havana, Cuba, when we 
didn't have diplomatic relations with Cuba officially.  The other thing is that on my very 
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first day to go there, I actually found the building empty.  And I thought because there 
was an [Elian Gonzales] march that was going to be taking place right there, because the 
Cubans whenever they would do big rallies to -- anti-U.S. rallies -- they would always do 
them right in front of that building to kind of deliver the message to the people inside the 
building.  And so I thought there was going to be a big Elian Gonzales -- that was the 
young little boy that came to the United States who floated in -- 
 
-- and they had a big, big battle over whether he was going to go back to Cuba or not. 
 
So anyway, I figured because there was supposed to be a big rally that afternoon they 
would shut the place down.  But turns out that was not the reason why.  It was President's 
Day in the United States which was a U.S. holiday. 
 
So they were all federal employees so it was shut down because they have the day off.  
So the next day I came and got my passport.  To tell you the difference between the 
Clinton years when Clinton was trying to do some outreach with regard to cultural ties in 
a much smaller way, Obama has ramped up big, big time compared to what Clinton was 
doing.  So along comes Bush and he puts a head in the U.S. Interests Sections in there 
who was very much in favor of what the president was doing in terms of trying to 
squeeze dollars on Cuba.  They were hoping the Cuban people would rise up during the 
Bush years and overthrow the Castros and that was the ultimate goal.   
 
And they began to meet with dissidents…And they started meeting in earnest with 
representatives inside the U.S. Interests Section who would go out and have these kind of 
clandestine meetings with Cubans who were involved in the dissident groups.  And the 
U.S. would talk to them about ways to disrupt the Cuban government and about what 
they were doing to squeeze the Cuban economy and they would bring money in to help 
support the dissident groups through a whole variety of different ways.  And most of the 
people who came in from the United States to meet with them would come in on a () 
license which was -- there are 12 categories of licenses available for people of the United 
States to be able to go to Cuba and the () license is one of those.   
 
So all of a sudden, one day 75 people in Cuba were arrested and charged with -- 
essentially with treason.  There were different charges and so forth for their activities 
within this dissident group and what they were doing with the United States government 
to help -- to try to overthrow their government.  It turns out the heads of the dissident 
group were all part of the Cuban government and they had been in that dissident group 
from the very beginning.  So the Cuban government was able to monitor the dissident 
groups because the leaders of the group were all part of the Cuban government.  So you 
had people from the United States government sitting down with people from the Cuban 
government who the United States government thought were dissidents -- 
 
-- plotting on all kinds of ways to try to help overthrow their government.  So along 
comes Christmas and the head of the U.S. Interests Section puts up a gigantic Christmas 
tree outside and they hung a gigantic star on it, a big white star, and they put 75 on the 
star.  And it was just a very subtle reminder to the people of Havana, keep in mind those 
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75 people who were all arrested and put in jail.  The Cuban government comes back and 
they put a gigantic billboard right on the seawall directly across the street from the U.S. 
Interest Section with photographs with Abu Ghraib prison on the billboard with some 
stuff in Spanish about, you know, how horrible the United States is.  So you get an image 
of two little boys in a pissing contest on a playground.  This is what the two governments 
were doing.   
 
So up comes the Christmas tree with a star on it and up comes the billboard from the 
Cubans.  Okay, got you.  Got you back.  Then the United States installs a one-story high 
digital scrolling billboard, the kind with lights with the letters that go by that you can 
leave messages and so forth, a message board, but it was one-story high.  It was six 
stories high in the air.  And they started sending messages to the Cuban people about how 
horrible their government was right on the front of this building.  So you can picture a 
seven-story building, at the sixth-story level, you know, one-story high digital letters 
sending messages like sitting on the computer, type it, sending all kinds of messages and 
so forth.  So United States, got you.  Right?  I mean, it's our turn to go, got you.  The 
Cuban government came back and they put -- I'm going to guess there 40 -- there may be 
60 or 70 flag poles, big aluminum gigantic flag poles.  You cannot put your arms around 
the base of them from when they start and they go up -- at exactly the same level as that 
electronic billboard.  They're flying black flags there with big, gigantic stars so that 
nobody -- they were close enough to the building, nobody could read the billboards.  So 
I'm not sure what would have happened next because Bush was out of office.  But again, 
it was back and forth, back and forth; Cuba versus the United States and so forth.  And all 
taking place right around this building.   
 
So Obama comes in, the billboard disappears, the rolling signs started sending little clips 
from CNN about world news and stuff like that.  It stopped sending messages about the 
Cuban government.  The flagpoles are still there.  Every once in a while they'll fly some 
Cuban flags, but not often at all are they used.  And so relations are improving.  Now the 
central part of all this stuff that I'm talking about in the weeds is that what Clinton did 
was pro-better relations.  What Bush did was no relations.  What Obama is doing is he 
has elevated the let's-have-normal-relations to a much higher level… 
 
And so Obama has really opened things up, but he can only do that to a point.  And he 
can't go beyond his ability as president because we still have a number of laws in place.  
One of them says that anytime somebody leaves Cuba and their foot steps on U.S. soil, 
they can be granted citizenship, the only country in the world where that happens.  If a 
Mexican comes in on U.S. soil and they're caught, they're sent back to Mexico 
theoretically.  It happens sometimes, it doesn't happen other times.  But theoretically, 
people from other countries are not allowed to come into the United States.  With a 
Cuban, if somebody gets on a raft or a boat in Cuba and they leave in the middle of the 
night and they manage to get to U.S. soil and they get off and their feet touch the U.S., 
then they can be granted U.S. citizenship automatically.  And we have a law in there in 
fact that's called wet-foot, dry-foot.   
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So the United States Coast Guard spends millions and millions and probably hundreds of 
millions of dollars every year out there patrolling between the United States and Cuba, 
catching Cubans and taking them back to Cuba.  There's -- I don't know if bad things 
happened to them in the past, but they don't now because I've actually known Cubans 
who tried to escape the island and were taken back.  It probably means they're not going 
to get a good government job or something like that, but I don't think anything really 
happens to them.  But the United States really doesn't want the kind of flood of Cubans 
that we had during the 1980's whatever, Fidel Castro -- when Jimmy Carter said, you 
know, we welcome Cubans.  And they were in a real battle.  Fidel Castro turned to all the 
people -- Cubans, you want to go to the United States?  Great, go.  We had this mass of 
people coming during the Mariel lift that the United States couldn't handle.  So the 
United States kind of negotiated with Cuba on this and said, okay, let's find a way to stop 
this.  So what they came up with was something called a lottery.  Have you ever heard of 
the Cuban lottery?   
 
…So here's what happens:  remember when I was speaking about the -- when I went to, 
because I lost my passport, the U.S. Interest Section?  There was this long line of people? 
 
Those were all Cubans that were going in to apply for the lottery.  So they would sit 
across the desk and they would say, I would like to go to the United States.  And the 
person on the other side would say, okay.  Have you worked in the military or for the 
Cuban government the last three years?  Because if you have, Cuban government is not 
going to allow you to participate in the lottery.  They would say, no, no, no.  I'm a banker 
or I'm an anesthesiologist or whatever.  And they would say, okay, if you would get to 
the States, do you speak English?  Do you have family there?  How would you support 
yourself and all that sort of stuff?  And they would say, I have family in New Jersey.  
They have a bakery.  I'm a baker.  I would work with them and so forth.   
 
And so they would satisfy the person who was taking information from them that they 
and their family would be eligible for the lottery.  That if the person won the lottery, they 
would be able to function in the United States.  They wouldn't be somebody that all of a 
sudden would immediately be dropped into our welfare system because they didn't speak 
any English, they had no skills, and so forth.  So these people were pre-qualified to be 
able to go to the United States.  So the U.S. government every year determines what the 
Cuban lottery is going to be.  Okay.  And so let's say Kyle goes in and you apply for the 
lottery.  And then when they do the annual drawing, you win the lottery.  That means that 
you have the right to be able to go on a plane, fly to the United States, and then become a 
U.S. citizen.  
 
Okay.  Why would the Cuban government go along with that?  And this all comes about 
based on the problems that we had after Mariel and all that kind of stuff when the Cuban 
government and the U.S. government sat down and worked out this system.  It's because 
the Cuban government would say, Kyle, do you want to go to the United States?  That's 
great.  But before you go, you need a medical exam.  That's going to be $400.  You are 
going to need to fill out these papers.  The word I had from Cubans I talked to, it cost 
about $1,500 -- 
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That goes to the Cuban government for every one of these people that leaves.  So all of a 
sudden, the larger the lottery, the more the Cuban government makes.  And the people 
that are leaving are not people that the Cuban government particularly care about one 
way or the other whether they are there or not.  You're a baker, you're an anesthesiologist.  
Now if you're a famous baseball player, forget it.  You're not going to win the lottery.  
The Cuban government wouldn't let you go.  If you are a famous ballerina, if you are a 
heart surgeon, if you are a really -- so in other words, certain people that the island 
considers national assets, treasures, and so forth, they are not going to be able to leave 
through the lottery system.  The lottery system is for folks like you and I.  But it's a big 
money maker.  So during the Bush years, they cut down on the lottery because they didn't 
want the Cuban government to have that money.  That's just one more thing that goes on.   
 
This story illustrates how political, economic, and symbolic actions at the national level 
combined to either support or denounce the irrational US-Cuba relationship under the embargo. 
A relationship in which both governments could publicly antagonize each other while 
simultaneously working together to profit off a favorable immigration policy meant bring reform 
to that very same system. Only under conditions of significant ambiguity could such an irrational 
system thrive. 
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Chapter Six 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 
The economic embargo of Cuba persists despite the growing public belief that it has been 
an abject failure. This study helps explain how US and Cuban policy entrepreneurs’ actions 
contributed to the reduction of economic sanctions over the past two years. The economic history 
of Cuba established the necessary context to better understand the influence of internal and 
external forces on Cuba’s economic performance over time. Typically, the impacts of trade 
agreements and trade liberalization processes are analyzed quantitatively. This study provides a 
qualitative approach to understanding trade impacts and the process of policy change by 
examining the case of US-Cuba diplomatic relations. The study sample consisted of Cubans and 
Americans from private and public sectors discussing events and experiences surrounding the 
longstanding embargo. The following discussion is a re-examination of the research sub-
questions in an effort to deepen understanding of this dissertation’s findings and its contribution 
to the larger public policy literature. 
The first sub-question covered the timing of events in this case study, attempting to 
understand the conditions leading to renewed commitments from the US and Cuba to normalized 
relations. 2014 marked the beginning of a new policy window in US-Cuba relations and 
according to this study’s results the following events had the greatest impact on its opening: the 
succession of Raúl Castro into the Cuban presidency, the second term for President Obama, the 
death of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, mediation from Pope Francis and the Roman 
Catholic church, and the rapid decrease in global oil prices. The coincident timing of these 
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significant events at the national level coupled with the actions of individual and state level 
policy entrepreneurs produced favorable conditions for the coupling of all three MSA streams.  
From a US perspective, presidents appear more willing to pursue more profound policy 
goals in their second terms in office. It was Bill Clinton that helped open a policy window in 
2000 when he signed TSRA near the end of his second term as president, re-initiating exports 
from the US to Cuba and laying the foundation for President Obama’s normalization efforts. 
This trend can most likely be attributed to presidential term limits (2) and the lack of future 
campaigns to strategize for. Moreover, the actions of national level policy entrepreneurs like 
presidents are disproportionately influential in the creation of policy windows. 
The second sub-question was designed to understand the kind of behavior policy 
entrepreneurs exhibited to help couple the three streams of MSA. Stakeholder interviews 
revealed that political, economic, and symbolic actions were most effective in guiding these 
streams to open policy windows. Again the behavior at the national level had the most impact in 
opening and extending policy windows. Politically, the content of rhetoric from President 
Obama, President Castro, and Pope Francis signaled a shift in policy strategies. President Obama 
claimed the embargo was ineffective and that it was time for a new approach with Cuba. 
President Castro’s speech in 2014 was careful to emphasize Cuban sovereignty while welcoming 
normal relations with the US. Economically, the search for new markets contributed to both 
American and Cuban interests in reducing trade barriers. TSRA opened up opportunities for new 
trade and policy entrepreneurs at the state and individual levels took advantage of that freedom. 
Symbolically, the coinciding speeches of presidents Obama and Castro in 2014 showed 
the world that both countries embraced this new commitment to normal relations. The visit of 
President Obama to Havana in March of 2016 was another symbolic act extending the viability 
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of the 2014 policy window. His physical presence supported US political rhetoric of 
normalization. This historic visit ended with another symbolic gesture from The Rolling Stones, 
a world-renowned rock and roll band, who played a free concert in Havana. Cuba’s embrace of 
these international cultural icons once again revealed their desire for normal relations with the 
entire global community, which could only be achieved through reparation of its diplomatic 
relationship with the US.  
Sub-question three focused on the how policy entrepreneur behavior affected change 
inside a policy window. In-depth interviews illustrated that the three main categories of 
influencing behaviors: political, economic, and symbolic, were employed at the individual, state, 
and national scales of organization. Despite the economic distortion of the US embargo, the 
quantitative analysis of the Cuban economy revealed that Cuba survived the last 55 years thanks 
to the strength of its external political relationships. The US embargo did not present an 
insurmountable challenge to the viability of either the Cuban or US economies. Therefore, the 
push for normalized relations originated from the politics stream as opposed to the problems or 
policies streams. The lack of a defined problem meant that the policy solutions were 
ideologically motivated. 
Once inside the policy windows of 2000 and 2014, policy entrepreneurs acted in search 
for rational policy, which was confirmed by re-occurring statements from interviewees stating 
the irrationality of current US policy towards Cuba. Individual and state policy entrepreneurs 
worked within the legal and political boundaries established at the national level. The political, 
economic, and symbolic actions of policy entrepreneurs at all three levels within both policy 
windows shifted the ideological narrative of US-Cuba relations. The problem was ideological 
and so policy entrepreneurs from the US and Cuba employed an advocacy approach aimed at 
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transforming the Cold War narrative of political aggression and isolation to a new regional 
cooperative narrative, guided by mutual national security and economic interests. 
Sub-question four guided inquiries into the connection between Cuban economic 
performance and political economy theory. Based on Cuba’s centralized socialist market 
economy, its government maintains a strong interventionist role in the economic fortunes of 
Cuban industry and the Cuban people. This study used the term political economy to refer to the 
organization of society through the interaction of political, economic, and social functions. Four 
separate eras defined the Cuban economy since achieving independence at the outset of the 
twentieth century: pre-US embargo, post-US embargo, post-Soviet Union dissolution, and the 
twenty-first century. 
During each economic era, Cuba relied on preferential political relationships to support 
its economy and provide for its people. The Cuban economy of the early twentieth-century relied 
heavily on close trade relations with the US, particularly on sugar and other agricultural 
products. Cuba experienced periods of growth and recession typically associated with market-
based economies, oftentimes following the economic trends of the US economy. Fidel Castro’s 
rise to power in 1959, his nationalization of the means of production, and institution of the US 
embargo marked the beginning of the second economic era. The once robust US-Cuba trade 
relationship ended and Cuba closely allayed itself politically, economically, and socially with the 
Soviet Union. Preferential trade agreements on oil and sugar established a de-facto economic 
subsidy for Cuba. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the Cuban economy faltered in absence of 
Soviet subsidies. This economic era represented the first time Cuba felt the negative impact of 
the US embargo as it sought new trade partners. The Special Period in Time of Peace spurred a 
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number of economic reforms including increased foreign direct investment opportunities, 
eventually stabilizing the economy. Similar to past political strategies, the turn of the century 
brought a new preferential trade agreement with Venezuela in what was popularly referred to as 
the doctors for oil program. Cuba sent its skilled doctors and medical professionals to Venezuela 
to help improve services while also training Venezuelan doctors back in Cuba. In exchange 
Venezuela exported oil to Cuba at below market value, to which Cuba could then re-export at 
significant profit, creating a new economic subsidy. This deal remains in effect today but with 
the global oil supply glut and the consistently low price of oil, Venezuelan oil is no longer the 
economic windfall it once was. As a result, Cuba is once again in search of new political partners 
to support its economy and the actions of national policy entrepreneurs helped create the current 
policy window for policy change in US-Cuba relations. 
Finally, sub-question five served as the guide for qualitative inquiry in the study relating 
interview content on policy entrepreneur behavior with the function of societal institutions. 
Interviews confirmed that the policymaking process is indeed a means by which individuals can 
encourage institutional change. In the case of modern US-Cuba relations, interviewees expressed 
their belief that the US embargo of Cuba was completely irrational. This position supported the 
argument that their concerns were ideological. As the interviews detailed the role of policy 
entrepreneurs in the reduction of sanctions, it became clear that their intentions were to change 
the existing public narrative surrounding the US-Cuba relationship. And through political, 
economic, and symbolic actions policy entrepreneurs of varying resources and access were able 
to have an ideological impact that subsequently influenced the policymaking process. 
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The decision to focus on policy entrepreneur behavior from the LMRR and the Havana 
metropolitan region was supported by their deep involvement in changing US-Cuba relations, 
even before the passage of TSRA. One study participant from the New Orleans metropolitan 
region described her frequent trips to Cuba in the 1980s and 1990s when US-Cuba relations 
remained antagonistic and the sanctions had became more restrictive. Other interviewees 
involved in the freight transportation sector of the LMRR approached the topic of normalized 
relations with Cuba from a unique perspective, defined by feelings of gain and loss. LMRR 
economies, particularly New Orleans, benefitted significantly from Cuban trade pre-revolution 
and embargo but they also suffered the greatest losses when that trade ended. It is through this 
lens that LMRR policy entrepreneurs approached US-Cuba relations, in what could be described 
as cautious optimism. LMRR is well positioned to once again benefit from improved US-Cuba 
relations in the tourism and agriculture sectors. However, interviewees’ tempered attitudes 
towards the potential for economic gain indicates that the benefits of normalized relations may 
be overstated and that political disagreements still loom large over the US-Cuba relationship. 
After 450 years of actual and de-facto occupation from outside forces, Castro presented 
Cubans with an opportunity to control their own political fate at the expense of switching from 
complete economic reliance on the US to reliance on the Soviet Union. In the lead up to the 
revolution in 1958 the Cuban economy was completely dependent on commodities exchange 
with the US. They catered to American tourists and Cuban industry was increasingly owned and 
operated by US interests, while average Cuban citizens faced chronic unemployment, civil rights 
violations, and lack of development outside of Havana. Castro’s seizure of foreign-owned 
property gave Cuba control of its land and industry but its economic dependence on foreign 
subsidies for viability meant another thirty years of vulnerability to outside forces. 
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It was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the subsequent economic 
depression of the early 1990s, that Cuba began to make the reforms necessary to regain control 
of its economic fate. The beginning of the twenty-first century brought another preferential trade 
agreement, this time with Venezuela for oil imports that Cuba could then re-export at a 
significant profit. With the death of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and the low price of oil on the 
global market, Cuba is in search of new economic opportunities. Beyond their close geographic 
proximity, neither the US or Cuba have a large incentive to trade with each other. Cuba 
represents a small market relative to the entirety of US international trade, but it is a significant 
opportunity for US states with strong agricultural and import/export economies. Certainly Cuba 
would benefit from increased access to US markets considering the reduced freight 
transportation costs, but there are other potential trade partners in the world economy. The 
embargo has hurt Cuba’s ability to trade with American ally nations, and it has distorted freight 
flows in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Even if the embargo is lifted, the Cuban government remains a barrier to economic 
stability due to past policy decisions. Cuba lacks the cash flow to immediately increase trade 
with the US; any significant changes in imports would likely divert trade from other current 
suppliers. The US and Cuba will need to resolve the issue of compensation for property seizures 
during the revolution before full trade can resume. Politically, American representatives continue 
to publicly advocate for full democratic rights for Cuban citizens. 
The short-term future of US-Cuba relations is dependent on the extent of policy change 
made within the current policy window. It is difficult to predict what normal relations will look 
like but Mesa-Lago (2006) describes how a socialist market economy like Cuba’s could succeed 
in the short-term, “It should be based on an intensive utilization of the skilled labor force with 
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high potential of learning, and technologically advanced ex-ports and services, an export-
oriented industrialization process relying on Cuba’s most important resources: its people.” (p. 
175) Multiple interview participants expressed that Mexico’s economic development was a 
reasonable model for potential growth in Cuba. They also identified the tourism, agriculture, 
telecommunications, and textile manufacturing (particularly denim) sectors as immediate 
beneficiaries in the absence of the embargo. Lektzian and Souva (2001) found that rebuilding 
economic trust and fostering democracy are critical elements to increased trade after years of 
sanctions. Furthermore, they concluded that the presence of democratic institutions re-stores 
confidence among trade partners by reducing transaction cost and uncertainty, leading to more 
rapid trade recovery. Based on this argument, as Cuban institutions adopt more democratic 
principles, the pace of trade restoration will increase. 
Beyond economic impacts, the uptake of democracy in Cuba also has implications for 
increased citizen participation. Another sentiment shared among participants was the idea that 
average Cuban citizens would become more empowered to make a political change with a 
greater economic stake in society. Subject G was especially optimistic for future US-Cuba 
relations despite past frustrations with the embargo because of her belief in the Cuban spirit, 
KG:  … so do you still, kind of going back to what you were saying earlier that you really 
thought that trade was a way to empower the people, do you still believe that? 
 
G:  Yes.  I truly think that that is the key.  Cubans think they've got to work.  Oh my god, 
they are the most hard-working people and they are so smart.  I mean, they have been -- I 
don't want to say overeducated.  I don't think anybody can be overeducated.  But because 
they have been so insulated for so long, they have had terrific education.  And they're 
creative…They're artists.  They're artisans.  It's just an amazing culture…  
 
So I do think that trade is the way to open those relationships back up…one of the most 
promising situations in Cuba is that unlike Russia, Cuba has only been under communism 
for about 50 years where there is still a collective memory of what free trade looks like.   
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Despite the negative impacts of the embargo, these last 55 years represent a short time in the 
long history of US-Cuba relations. As the previous dialogue illustrates, the lessons learned from 
past relations can inform new negotiations that protect Cuban sovereignty and US economic 
interests in the Gulf of Mexico.
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Conclusions 
 
 
The LMRR of the US is a critical node in the flow of global commerce to and from the 
world’s largest economy. Cuba’s central location within the major shipping routes of the 
Caribbean Basin and their ability to disrupt these freight flows elevates the significance of their 
relationship with the US. As one of America’s longest-standing trade policies, the embargo has 
not achieved its intended goal of political regime change in Cuba. The coinciding presidential 
speeches of 2014 marked the beginning of an opportunity for policy change i.e. policy window. 
This study investigated the behavior of policy entrepreneurs on the process of restoring 
diplomatic relations and effectively disrupting the cycle of political, economic, and social 
interaction defined by political economy theory. 
The results of the study suggest that policy entrepreneurs operate at the individual, state, 
and national scales of society using a variety of symbols to create and broaden opportunities for 
policy change. Diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba over the last 55 plus years can 
best described as “not normal”, wholly different from US relations with the rest of the world. 
Across all three levels, US and Cuban policy entrepreneur’s behavior is guided by the search for 
rationality in an ambiguous or unusual environment. Their actions can be classified into three 
separate categories: political, economic, and symbolic. 
At the individual level, policy entrepreneurs in both countries relied on the use of 
symbols (cultural gestures, travel, way of life) to build relationships and advocate for change. At 
the state level, policy entrepreneurs used existing ideological conflicts to create meaning and 
further agendas. In this case, following the passage of the TSRA in 2000, which loosened export 
restrictions to Cuba, state actors in search of new trade markets became the leading voice in 
petitioning the federal government for policy change. In this way the political issue of the US 
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embargo of Cuba was subsumed into the greater American federalism debate, as to the role of 
the federal government and individual states in governance. Though this study focuses on the 
influence of policy entrepreneurs in the process of normalizing relations, their agency is bounded 
by the parameters of what is legally and politically acceptable, often determined institutionally. 
National policy entrepreneurs like US President Barack Obama, Cuban President Raúl Castro, 
and Pope Francis of the Roman Catholic Church exercise significant power in policymaking by 
opening and extending policy windows in addition to framing the terms of debate once inside. 
Consequently, the culmination of behavior from these three types of policy entrepreneurs is one 
approach to re-structuring society’s institutions through the manipulation of the policymaking 
process. 
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Appendix A: 
 
ENG 1 
Subject:   
Date:  
Place:  
Affiliations:  
Goals: 
 To explore what kinds of actions policy entrepreneurs made and are continuing to make 
throughout the Obama presidency  
 To understand the relationship freight transportation and the policymaking process 
 To investigate how the US embargo of Cuba rose to the top of the policy agenda 
 30-45 minute interview 
Questions: 
1. Tell me a little about yourself, where did you grow up?  
2. Can you give me a run down of your work experience? e.g. places you’ve worked, jobs 
you’ve held etc. What drew you to your current industry? 
3. Thinking about your current job, how would you describe your day-to-day job duties? 
4. What are some of the professional organizations that you’d say you’re an active member 
of? 
5. Let’s talk about trade; how do you see the role of the Louisiana/ US Gulf Coast in the 
global economy? 
6. How do you think other countries view the US right now? 
7. Thinking about your specific job tasks, can you describe the impact of government 
policies and regulations on your industry? 
a. Now with those impacts you just listed, would you make a distinction between 
local, state, and federal policies? 
b. Can you think of different perspectives on government policy and regulation that 
are out there? Maybe from friends, colleagues or other industries… 
8. What would you say is the industry perspective on policymakers at the local, state, 
federal level?  
9. Shifting gears a bit, what are your thoughts about Cuba? 
10. Can you give me a laundry list of people or organizations you think are behind the latest 
push for full trade with Cuba? 
11. Which industries and regions currently benefit from the embargo? Who will be the 
winners and losers if the embargo is lifted? 
12. Is there anything else you’d like to add that we didn’t cover? 
Notes:  
 138 
ENG 2 
Subject:   
Date:  
Place:  
Affiliations:  
Goals: 
 To explore what kinds of actions policy entrepreneurs made and are continuing to make 
throughout the Obama presidency  
 To understand the relationship freight transportation and the policymaking process 
 To investigate how the US embargo of Cuba rose to the top of the policy agenda 
 30-45 minute interview 
Questions: 
1. Tell me a little about yourself, where did you grow up?  
2. Can you give me a run down of your work experience? e.g. places you’ve worked, jobs 
you’ve held etc. What drew you to your current industry? 
3. Can you tell me a little about your business? 
4. Let’s talk about trade; how do you see the role of the Louisiana/ US Gulf Coast in the 
global economy? 
5. How do you think other countries view the US right now? 
6. Shifting gears a bit, what are your thoughts about Cuba?  
7. With regard to Cuban’s daily life, how do you think they have survived considering the 
influence of US sanctions and the Castro-led government? 
8. What are the greatest forms of oppression in your mind imposed on the Cuban people by 
their government? 
9. Who would you say reached out first following the 2000 TSRE Act? Americans or 
Cubans? 
10. Once states decided to rebuild trade relations with Cuba, what was the strategy in dealing 
with the federal government and navigating the economic sanctions? 
11. What do you think will happen in US politics as relations continue to normalize? Do 
demographics changes in the US play a role? 
12. What policy changes in particular from the US will best help average Cuban citizens? 
13. Is there anything else you’d like to add that we didn’t cover? 
Notes: 
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Entrevista – Cuba, febrero 2016 
SPA 
ID de investigacion: 
Fecha: 
Lugar: 
Afiliaciones: 
Objetivos : 
3)  
 Explorar qué tipo de acción los gestores de cambio de políticas (policy entrepreneurs) 
hizo y continúan haciendo durante la presidencia de Obama 
 Comprender la relación entre el transporte de mercancías y el proceso de formulación de 
políticas 
 Investigar cómo el embargo de Estados Unidos contra Cuba llegó a la cima de la agenda 
política 
 Entrevista 30-45 minutos 
Preguntas: 
1. Cuéntar un poco sobre usted, ¿Cuál es su profesión? ¿Algo de su vida?  
2. ¿Puede usted darme un recorrido por su experiencia de trabajo? por ejemplo, los lugares 
donde ha trabajado, los trabajos que ha celebrado etc. ¿Qué llevó usted a el sector de 
transporte de carga? 
3. Relativo a su trabajo actual, ¿cómo describiría sus funciones de trabajo cotidiano? 
4. ¿Usted es un miembro activo de algunos organismos profesionales?  
4) ¿Cómo describiría la importancia del transporte de carga en la sociedad Cubana? 
5. En ese sentido, ¿Cómo ve el papel de los EE.UU. en la economía global? 
6. ¿Cómo cree que otros países consideran que Cuba en este momento?  
5) En relación con sus tareas específicas del trabajo, ¿puede describir el impacto de las políticas 
del gobierno y reglamentos sobre el transporte de carga? 
6) a. Ahora con los impactos que acabo de enumerar, puede distinguir entre políticas 
locales, estatales, y federales? 
7) b. ¿Puedes pensar en diferentes puntos de vista sobre estas políticas y 
regulaciones? Tal vez de amigos, colegas o industrias (intermediarios, 
transportistas...) 
7. ¿Cuál diría usted que es la perspectiva de la industria sobre los planificadores y los 
formuladores de políticas en nivel estatal y local? 
8. Cambiando de tema, ¿cuáles son sus pensamientos sobre los EE.UU.? 
9. ¿Me puede dar una larga lista de organismos o personas que considera que están detrás 
del último impulso para el comercio total con Cuba? 
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10. ¿En este momento qué industrias y regiones benefician del embargo? ¿Quiénes serán los 
ganadores y perdedores si se levanta el embargo? 
11. ¿Hay algo más que a usted le gustaría que decir sobre este tema y que no cubrimos? 
12. Notas: 
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